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SUSTAINABLE FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT: 
PROTECTING ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY AND 
PRESERVING ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPAL 
Robert L. Glicksman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of sustainability plays a central role in environmental regulation1and 
natural resource management.2  Despite the concept’s importance to the planning and 
implementation of environmental policy, its meaning remains elusive.  One problem in 
coming to grips with the significance of sustainability in environmental law and policy is 
its appearance in several guises.  In the context of international environmental law, the 
goal of achieving sustainable development has been paramount for at least two decades.3  
The multiple use federal land management agencies, like the United States Forest 
Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), have long been obliged to manage 
the lands and resources they control in accordance with the principles of multiple use and 
sustained yield.4  In other contexts, sustainability is used as an unadorned, freestanding 
noun, instead of as an adjective that modifies some other term.5  These formulations are 
not necessarily synonymous.6  In addition, regardless of the formulation, sustainability 
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for sharing her insights and for her willingness to explore the implications of public trust law for public land 
management with me.  I thank Jamie Grodsky for going above and beyond the call of duty in making 
suggestions that were essential to the editing process and the crafting of the final version of the article.  Finally, 
I thank the faculty at The George Washington University Law School for useful feedback provided at a 
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 1. See Environmental Law for Sustainability: Environmental Law for Sustainability: A Reader 11 
(Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood eds., Hart Publg. 2006) (asserting that during the 1990s, there was “a 
transformation in the central goal of environmental regulation, from environmental protection to ‘sustainable 
development.’ . . .  Based on conceiving economic prosperity as dependent on maintenance of environmental 
health, sustainable development is perhaps the most significant normative influence on environmental 
regulation today.”) [hereinafter Environmental Law]. 
 2. See Comm. of Scientists, Sustaining the People’s Lands: Recommendations for Stewardship of the 
National Forests and Grasslands into the Next Century 13 (Mar. 1999) [hereinafter Scientists] (“Today, 
sustainability is widely recognized as the overarching objective of land and resource stewardship.”). 
 3. See infra nn. 26–55 and accompanying text. 
 4. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 529 (2006); id. at § 1604(e)(1); 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7) (2006); id. at 
1712(c)(1) (2006). 
 5. See e.g. Scientists, supra n. 2, at 14 (stating that “[t]he term sustainability has come into widespread use 
in relatively recent times”). 
 6. See e.g. Environmental Law, supra n. 1, at 13 (stating that “‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable 
development’ are not synonymous”). 
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may have ecological, economic, and social components.7 
The result of this proliferation of terms relating to sustainability has been 
dissatisfaction with its use as a guiding principle of environmental policy.8  The various 
formulations of sustainability have been criticized as, among other things, vague,9 
slippery,10 oxymoronic,11 a “mask[er] [of] failed consensus,”12 and a reflection of 
political correctness.13  Further, according to some scholars, the amorphous nature of 
sustainability saps it of much of the normative power it might otherwise have.14  Others 
have suggested that the concept of sustainability becomes more useful if it is viewed as 
operating at two levels.  First, it functions as a “broad social objective,”15 a “higher-
order social goal,” or “a fundamental property of natural or human systems.”16  At this 
level, the core value of sustainability is intergenerational equity.17  The objective of 
sustainability is to prevent current resource use from damaging the opportunities of 
future generations.  Second, it may be useful on a more concrete level as a resource 
 
 7. See Charles F. Wilkinson, A Case Study in the Intersection of Law and Science: The 1999 Report of the 
Committee of Scientists, 42 Ariz. L. Rev. 307, 313 (2000) (“The accepted formulation is that the objective is to 
sustain ecological, economic, and social values.”). 
 8. According to Professor Douglas Kysar, “the term has taken on a life of its own, finding diverse 
expression in all manner of environmental treaties, trade agreements, international aid programs, presidential 
council reports, state and local planning schemes, corporate mission statements, investment fund charters, NGO 
policy documents, and so on.”  Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 
83 Tex. L. Rev. 2109, 2115 (2005).  He adds that, “[d]espite, or perhaps because of, this enormous degree of 
attention and apparent acceptance, the results of the sustainable development movement have been decidedly 
mixed, both in terms of conceptual clarity and programmatic success.”  Id. 
 9. See Scientists, supra n. 2, at 13 (describing the term as “so vague that it eludes definition [and] is 
impossible to define . . . in a generic fashion that applies across the board to all natural systems”); see also 
David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism’s Shotgun Wedding: Emissions Trading 
under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 Ind. L.J. 21, 29 (2008) (“Definitions of the concept [of sustainable development] 
vary and many scholars lament its lack of precision.”); Environmental Law, supra n. 1, at 13–14 (“Many see 
sustainable development as riddled with ambiguity and contradictions that undermine its usefulness.”). 
 10. “The still slippery concept of sustainable development continues as the contemporary resource use 
paradigm.”  Helen Endre-Stacy, Sustaining ESD in Australia, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.935, 935 (1994). 
 11. “Some have argued that the term sustainable development is oxymoronic (how can development, as 
change, be sustainable), or so general as to be meaningless.”  Edith Brown Weiss et al., International 
Environmental Law and Policy 45 (2d ed., Aspen Publishers 2007). 
 12. Christopher D. Stone, Deciphering “Sustainable Development,” 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 977, 978 (1994).  
Stone adds: “‘Sustainable development’ functions to gloss over not only failed consensus, but a latent collision 
course.  The chasm is less a failure of language . . . than a poignant tussle between, roughly, Rich and Poor.”  
Id. 
 13. Emily Fisher, Sustainable Development and Environmental Justice: Same Planet, Different Worlds? 26 
Environs: Envtl. L. & Policy J. 201, 201 (2002). 
 14. See John Martin Gillroy, Adjudication Norms, Dispute Settlement Regimes and International Tribunals: 
The Status of “Environmental Sustainability” in International Jurisprudence, 42 Stan. J. Intl. L. 1, 2 (2006) 
(referring to “a number of competing and even contradictory sub-principles which dilute and dissipate its 
normative power to command the construction and operation of an institutional dispute resolution regime of its 
own”).  Cf. Environmental Law, supra n. 1, at 13 (arguing that “sustainability remains essentially a contested 
discourse rather than a set of reified policy concepts and management procedures”). 
 15. Scientists, supra n. 2, at 13 (concluding that “sustainability has great appeal as a broad societal 
objective, as a symbol of the fundamental values we hold as a people”); see Wilkinson, supra n. 7, at 313. 
 16. Environmental Law, supra n. 1, at 13.  See also id. at 31 (asserting that “sustainability is best 
understood as a higher order social goal akin to other goals widely supported in a given society, such as 
democracy, equity, religious conformity, rule of law or justice” (emphasis in original)). 
 17. See Driesen, supra n. 9, at 29 (“Scholars studying sustainable development refer to the consideration of 
future generations’ needs under the rubric of intergenerational equity.”); Jaye Ellis & Stepan Wood, 
International Environmental Law, in Environmental Law, supra n. 1, at 377 (“One aspect of the discourse of 
equity that has attracted broad consensus among international lawyers is the proposition that sustainability rests 
on a commitment to respect the needs of future generations, ie, a commitment to inter-generational equity.”). 
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management tool, although its meaning at this level necessarily changes to accommodate 
the particular physical, economic, and social context in which it is being applied.18 
The multiple meanings (or the lack of any useful meaning, depending upon one’s 
point of view) of sustainability can cloud analysis of its import in environmental and 
natural resource management law.  Fortunately, my aim in this Article is not to provide a 
universally applicable take on the meaning of sustainability.  Instead, the Article 
explores the application of sustainability to management of lands and resources under the 
jurisdiction of the Forest Service and the BLM.  These two agencies have operated for 
decades under a mandate to manage the public lands and resources for which they are 
responsible in a manner that achieves sustained yield.  In this context, sustainability has 
operated to date primarily in an aspirational fashion, as a broad objective of public land 
management.  For the most part, it has not functioned as a useful management tool or as 
an enforceable constraint on agency management discretion. 
The purpose of this Article is to urge the adoption of amendments to the laws 
under which the Forest Service and the BLM operate to make them more consistent with 
the core function of sustainability—to ensure that the valuable environmental services 
provided by the lands and resources these agencies manage remain unimpaired for both 
present and future generations in the face of both natural disturbances and human use.  In 
particular, the Article recommends that Congress recognize that federal lands and 
resources are held by the multiple use agencies in trust for the benefit of present and 
future generations and create a mechanism by which private citizens or public interest 
groups may sue the agencies if they waste trust assets or otherwise breach their fiduciary 
obligations to the American people.  The Article explores what the agencies’ core trust 
responsibilities should entail and provides examples of management standards that either 
Congress or the agencies might adopt to codify those obligations to assist judicial review 
of alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. 
Part II of the Article discusses the development of the concept of sustainability in 
both international and U.S. domestic environmental and natural resource management 
law.  Its discussion of domestic law focuses on the evolution of the sustained yield 
mandate that governs both the Forest Service and the BLM.  It argues that, despite 
periodic overhauls to the federal land management laws to require protection of 
previously neglected environmental resources and values, the statutes continue (though 
less egregiously than before) to reflect a tilt toward a commodity production orientation 
that gives short shrift to the maintenance of environmental sustainability.  Part III 
addresses the implementation of the statutory sustained yield mandate by the Forest 
Service and the BLM.  It demonstrates that, even if the statutes appropriately temper the 
agencies’ authority to authorize commodity production and resource extraction with the 
responsibility to ensure sustainability, Congress has failed to translate the inspirational 
goal of protecting sustainability into a meaningful and enforceable mandate by which the 
Forest Service and the BLM may be held accountable. 
Part IV develops the argument that Congress should transform the obligations of 
the multiple use agencies by creating a natural resource trust whose purpose is to assure 
that the trust assets (the lands and resources managed by the Forest Service and the 
 
 18. See Scientists, supra n. 2, at 13–14. 
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BLM) are sufficiently healthy and resilient that they continue to generate valuable 
ecosystem services that benefit present and future generations, notwithstanding natural 
disturbances and human use.  The trust mechanism explored here is modeled after 
natural resource trust arrangements that exist or that have been proposed in other 
contexts.  First, the common law system of estates and future interests imposes 
obligations on current users to preserve property value for the benefit of future interest 
holders.  The specific nature of the rights of present and future interest holders is often 
specified in trust arrangements, which also impose enforceable fiduciary duties on 
trustees who represent the interests of the holders of equitable present and future interest 
holders.  Second, the courts in this country have long recognized that the states hold 
certain natural resources in trust, although the scope of the trust and the nature of the 
fiduciary obligations it creates continue to be disputed.  This state public trust doctrine 
(which currently derives from a combination of common law, statute, and constitutional 
provisions) has never taken root in the federal land management arena.  Third, Congress 
has created, or the courts have recognized the existence of, trust responsibilities in 
limited federal lands contexts.  The clearest example is the trust responsibilities that bind 
the federal government in the management of Indian lands, but federal pollution control 
statutes also create trust obligations for agencies that manage certain polluted resources.  
Congress has never extended trust protections, however, to federal lands in general or to 
the lands managed by the Forest Service and the BLM in particular.  Finally, and perhaps 
of most direct relevance here, other scholars—notably Edith Brown Weiss—have argued 
that the use of trust concepts in the international environmental law context is a useful 
device for promoting intergenerational equity. 
This Article extends the trust concept beyond these areas by applying it to 
domestic federal public natural resources law in ways that current law does not 
accomplish.  Under the trust mechanism recommended here, the multiple use agencies 
would be designated as trustees, obliged to manage the lands and resources they control 
for the continued benefit of present and future generations.  The agencies would be 
allowed to expend the “income” generated by the resources under their control, but they 
would be prohibited from invading the “principal” of the trust corpus or from otherwise 
wasting trust assets.  The legislation creating the trust also would authorize lawsuits 
against the agencies for breach of fiduciary duty to prevent them from invading 
“ecological principal” or to force them to restore improperly damaged trust assets. 
Part IV below recognizes that a vague mandate to avoid waste or to protect the 
natural resources that comprise the trust corpus is not likely to suffice to create the kind 
of accountable mechanism for protecting sustainability that the federal land management 
laws currently lack.  Accordingly, that part provides examples of the kinds of specific 
substantive standards that might be useful in defining the responsibilities of the trustees 
in managing the lands and resources entrusted to their care.  It points to the certification 
processes created by the Forest Stewardship Council and the Fisheries Stewardship 
Council, coalitions of non-governmental organizations that promote sustainable forest 
and fisheries management, as possible models for transforming sustainability from an 
aspirational objective to an enforceable mandate to which the Forest Service and the 
BLM can be held accountable when they make specific resource management decisions. 
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II. THE ROLE OF SUSTAINABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
The concept of sustainability plays perhaps its most prominent role in international 
environmental law, which, since the 1980s, has focused on the achievement of 
sustainable development.  But versions of sustainability are also woven into the fabric of 
domestic environmental law, particularly the laws governing public natural resource 
management.  This Part traces the development of the concept of sustainability in both 
contexts and identifies some of the common threads and disparities reflected in the use of 
different variations of the term. The detailed analysis of the provisions of the organic 
statutes of the multiple use agencies that follows is designed to explain why the version 
of sustainable resource use that governs management of the multiple use federal lands is 
much weaker than the international law version of sustainability.  In particular, the 
statutory multiple use version of sustainability is more susceptible to interpretations that 
prioritize short-term commodity development at the expense of protection of long-term 
resource value.  The organic statutes for the Forest Service and the BLM continue to 
reflect this weak domestic version of sustainability despite a series of overhauls through 
which Congress sought to strengthen protection of conservation values.  The function of 
the science-based standards and trust concepts proposed in Part IV is to provide a series 
of enforceable mandates by which the Forest Service and the BLM may be held 
accountable if they deviate from their obligations to protect ecosystem services for the 
long as well as the short term. 
A. The Importance of Sustainability 
The purpose of this Article is not to provide a complete analysis of the value of 
achieving sustainable natural resource use and development.  Nevertheless, the 
relationship between ecological degradation and social and economic vitality has perhaps 
never been clearer than it is now, both on and off the federal lands.19  The breakdown of 
natural systems that has already occurred or is expected to occur as a result of global 
climate change is providing stark examples on a regular basis.  Unless greenhouse gas 
emissions are significantly reduced, populated parts of the globe may become 
uninhabitable as a result of desertification,20 flooding, or coastal inundation linked to 
climate change.21  The dislocation and loss of property that resulted from Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita in 2005 reflect the social and economic disruption that even a couple of 
severe storms are capable of producing.  Climate change is likely to increase 
temperatures and reduce water supplies in some areas, adversely affecting economies 
that are highly dependent on agricultural production.22  Rising temperatures will increase 
 
 19. Cf. Driesen, supra n. 9, at 29–30 (describing view that “proper economic development . . . will 
simultaneously protect the environment and aid poverty elimination and leads to support for governance 
reforms integrating economic development and environmental decision making,” so that “environmental policy 
and economic development [are] complimentary. . . .”). 
 20. See Ramond P. Motha & Wolfgang Baier, Impacts of Present and Future Climate Change and Climate 
Variability on Agriculture in the Temperate Regions: North America, 70 Climatic Change 137, 160 (2005). 
 21. See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Global Climate Change and the Risks to Coastal Areas from 
Hurricanes and Rising Sea Levels: The Costs of Doing Nothing, 52 Loy. L. Rev. 1127 (2006). 
 22. See e.g. Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the 
Fourth Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 91 (copy on file with author) 
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the risk of wildfires in the west, with attendant property losses and a decline in the 
amount of harvestable timber that is available to loggers.23  Drought conditions and 
changes in vegetation patterns in the American West that are linked to climate change 
bode ill for ranchers, who might find it impossible to sustain range populations at their 
previous size.24 
The question this Article addresses is whether the statutes governing the multiple 
use lands managed by the Forest Service and the BLM mandate sustainable land and 
resource management, as this Article conceives of that term, and whether the statute is 
sufficient to hold the agencies accountable for adhering to the sustainability mandate.  As 
the remainder of this part and Part III indicate, the organic statutes for the Forest Service 
and the BLM provide a more amorphous, and less environmentally protective take on 
sustainability than the international law version described immediately below.25  Part IV 
of the Article describes how those statutes can be amended to provide greater assurance 
that public natural resources, such as the lands managed by the multiple use agencies, 
remain capable of providing valuable environmental services for present and future 
generations. 
B. International Environmental Law and Sustainable Development 
The earliest appearance of the term “sustainable development” in public 
environmental law discourse may have occurred in the World Conservation Strategy, a 
document prepared in 1980 by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources (IUCN).26  The IUCN “defined sustainable development as ‘the 
integration of conservation and development to ensure that modifications to the planet do 
indeed secure the survival and well-being of all people.’”27  The Strategy identified 
priority global conservation issues and proposed ways for dealing with them to achieve 
sustainable development.28 
Sustainable development took on added significance with the publication in 1987 
by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, also known as the 
Brundtland Commission) of its report, Our Common Future.29  The WCED defined 
 
(describing the likelihood that global warming will increase rainfall in the northeastern U.S., but reduce it in 
the southwest). 
 23. See e.g. Allianz Group & World Wildlife Fund, Climate Change and Insurance: An Agenda for Action 
in the United States 17–18 (Oct. 2006) (available at http://www.worldwildlife.org/climate/ 
Publications/WWFBinaryitem4913.pdf); Kathleen A. Miller, Climate Change and Water in the West: 
Complexities, Uncertainties, and Strategies for Adaptation, 27 J. Land, Resources, & Envtl. L. 87, 89–90 
(2007). 
 24. U.S. Govt. Accountability Off., Climate Change: Agencies Should Develop Guidance for Addressing 
Effects on Federal Land and Water Resources 33 (Aug. 2007) (available at http://www.gao.gov/new. 
items/d07863.pdf). 
 25. See George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Public Natural Resources Law vol. 3, § 30:4 (2d 
ed., Thomson West 2007) (asserting that sustainability “is intended to be somewhat broader” than sustained 
yield). 
 26. Weiss et al., supra n. 11, at 44. 
 27. Id. (citing Intl. Union for Conserv. of Nat. and Nat. Resources, World Conserv. Strategy: Living 
Resource Conserv. for Sustainable Dev. (1980)). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Our Common Future: The World Commission on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/42/47 
(1987) (reprinted in Our Common Future: The World Commission on Environment and Development (Oxford 
U. Press, 1987) [hereinafter Our Common Future]). 
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sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”30  According to 
the report, “sustainable development is not a fixed state of harmony, but rather a process 
of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the 
orientation of technological development, and institutional change are made consistent 
with future as well as present needs.”31  Sustainable development did not envision a halt 
to economic growth.  Indeed, the WCED’s report asserted that the elimination of poverty 
and underdevelopment require a new era of economic growth.32  Further, the report 
recognized that “[e]conomic growth always brings risk of environmental damage, as it 
puts increased pressure on environmental resources.”33  The aim of sustainable 
development would be “to assure that growing economies remain firmly attached to their 
ecological roots and that these roots are protected and nurtured so that they may support 
growth over the long term.  Environmental protection is thus inherent in the concept of 
sustainable development, as is a focus on the sources of environmental problems rather 
than the symptoms.”34 
Our Common Future also addressed the impact of sustainable development on 
particular resources.  It acknowledged that sustainable development implied limits 
resulting from current technologies and social organization, as well as the planet’s ability 
to absorb the effects of human activities.35  Under a regime of sustainable development, 
development of renewable resources would have to take into “account system-wide 
effects of exploitation.”36  The pace of use of nonrenewable resources such as minerals 
and fossil fuels would be managed to ensure that those resources do not run out before 
the discovery of acceptable substitutes.37  Because species loss is irreversible, 
sustainable development requires the conservation of plant and animal species.38  It also 
requires minimization of the adverse impacts of development on air and water quality so 
that “the ecosystem’s overall integrity” is not impaired.39 
The report identified as the “common theme throughout [its] strategy for 
sustainable development . . . the need to integrate economic and ecological 
considerations in decision making.”40  It characterized that strategy “[i]n its broadest 
sense” as the promotion of “harmony among human beings and between humanity and 
nature.”41  Among the prerequisites for sustainable development it identified was “a 
production system that respects the obligation to preserve the ecological base for 
 
 30. Id. at 43.  The report added that the term “contains within it two key concepts: the concept of ‘needs,’ in 
particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of 
limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet 
present and future needs.”  Id. 
 31. Id. at 9. 
 32. Id. at 40. 
 33. Our Common Future, supra n. 29, at 40. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 8. 
 36. Id. at 45. 
 37. Id. at 45–46.  “Sustainable development requires that the rate of depletion of non-renewable resources 
should foreclose as few future options as possible.”  Our Common Future, supra n. 29, at 46. 
 38. Id. at 46. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 62. 
 41. Id. at 65. 
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development.”42  Finally, the report justified its strategy for achieving sustainable 
development on both utilitarian and moral grounds: “If needs are to be met on a 
sustainable basis the Earth’s natural resource base must be conserved and enhanced. . . .  
However, the case for the conservation of nature should not rest only with development 
goals.  It is part of our moral obligation to other living beings and future generations.”43 
The WCED report laid the groundwork for the formal incorporation of sustainable 
development into several of the principles set forth at the 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro.  Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development declared that human beings are at the center of 
sustainable development concerns and that “[t]hey are entitled to a healthy and 
productive life in harmony in nature.”44  Principle 3 drew upon the concern of the 
Brundtland Commission for the welfare of future generations.  It declared that the “right 
to development” had to be fulfilled in a way that equitably meets both the 
“developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.”45  
According to Principle 4, “[i]n order to achieve sustainable development, environmental 
protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be 
considered in isolation from it.”46  Finally, Principle 8 called on states to “reduce and 
eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption” in order to achieve 
sustainable development and a higher quality of life for everyone.47 
In the wake of the Rio Conference, sustainable development became a bedrock 
objective of international environmental law, even though some international 
environmental law specialists interpret the Rio Declaration as subordinating 
environmental protection to the right to develop.48  These experts, however, continue to 
disagree on precisely what sustainable development means.49  One account breaks down 
sustainable development into four principal characteristics, including protection of 
essential environmental (or ecosystem) services,50 while another delineates five principal 
aims at “the core of the still-emerging sustainable development paradigm.”51  Yet 
 
 42. Our Common Future, supra n. 29, at 65. 
 43. Id. at 57. 
 44. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development Principle 1 (June 14, 1992), 31 I.L.M. 874, 876. 
 45. Id. at 877. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See John S. Applegate & Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Introduction: Syncopated Sustainable Development, 9 
Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 1, 3 (2001) (“In short, Rio replaced a right to a healthy environment with a right to 
develop, and environmental protection was relegated to a distinctly secondary status.”). 
 49. See Gillroy, supra n. 14, at 14 (quoting Philippe Sands, International Law in the Field of Sustainable 
Development, 65 British Y.B. Intl. L. 303, 379 (1994)) (“‘[S]ustainable development’ is now established in 
international law, even if its meaning and effect are uncertain.”).  In addition, not all nations, including 
signatories to the Rio Declaration and other international agreements endorsing sustainable development, have 
been equally committed to practicing it.  See e.g. A. Dan Tarlock, Ideas Without Institutions: The Paradox of 
Sustainable Development, 9 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 35, 38–39 (2001) (“As it now does on all international 
environmental protection issues, the United States lags behind many parts of the world in its commitment to 
SD.”). 
 50. Weiss et al., supra n. 11, at 46–47.  The others are the obligation of those responsible for development 
to consider “intergenerational equity,” the obligation to pursue development that meets the “needs of the 
world’s poor” (“intragenerational equity”), and integration of “environmental, economic, and social issues.”  
Id. 
 51. Kysar, supra n.8, at 2116.  These are “integrated policy assessment, environmental sustainability, 
intragenerational equity, [meaningful] political participation, and intergenerational responsibility.”  Id. (citing 
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another version of sustainability finds that it reflects eight “sub-principles,” four 
“substantive” ones and four “procedural” ones.52 In particular, there appear to be two 
conflicting versions of sustainability.  International law experts distinguish between 
“hard” and “soft” versions of sustainability, one of which has more bite as a binding 
legal norm than the other.  Professors Applegate and Aman have explained that “[t]he 
hard version would impose real restrictions on the nature and extent of development in 
the name of sustainability.  The soft version treats sustainable development as a set of 
very general guidelines or goals, a position reinforced by the essentially hortatory nature 
of the international instrument that first formally adopted it.”53 
Yet, these disparate accounts of what sustainable development means seem to 
coalesce around a common foundation.  Professor Douglas Kysar describes these two 
core attributes of sustainable development as follows: 
Perhaps the most widely accepted meaning of sustainable development is that there is some 
obligation to consider and protect the interests of future generations in relation to the 
natural environment.  This responsibility usually is translated as a “need to preserve natural 
resources for the benefit of future generations.” . . .  More broadly, the framework also 
demands that present generations avoid disrupting the basic integrity of those ecological 
systems upon which all life and human activity are thought to depend.  Recognizing that 
the earth’s vital biophysical processes are characterized by uncertainty, irreversibilities, 
critical thresholds, and other hallmark features of complex, dynamic systems, proponents 
of sustainable development argue that present generations should establish “safe minimum 
standards . . . for protecting Earth’s life-support systems in the face of virtually inevitable 
unpleasant surprises.”54 
Thus, sustainable resource use entails a commitment on the part of the present generation 
to protect the interests of future generations by avoiding the disruption of the basic 
integrity of ecological systems upon which life depends.55 
This conception of sustainability is comprehensible only if one defines the concept 
of ecological integrity.  Ecological integrity is protected if “the capacity of the Earth’s 
ecosystems [can] continue functioning so that the environmental services, upon which 
 
Ltr. from the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the United Nations and the Chargé d’affaires of the 
Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Aug. 6, 2002), UN 
GAOR, 57th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 89, at 3, UN Doc. A/57/329 (2002)). 
 52. Gillroy, supra n. 14, at 12.  The four “substantive principles” are “the prevention principle,” “the 
precautionary principle,” “sovereignty over internal resources combined with a duty not to pollute across 
territorial borders, and . . . the right to equitable development, which represents the resource economics 
definition of sustainability.”  Id.  The four “procedural principles” of sustainable development are “(1) the 
integration of environment and development, (2) a concern for future generations and their welfare, (3) the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility, and (4) the polluter-pays principle.”  Id. 
 53. Applegate & Aman, supra n. 48, at 2–3.  See also Environmental Law, supra n. 1, at 14 (stating that 
weak sustainability “aims essentially to make our political and economic systems more ‘environmentally 
sensitive’, but without any fundamental institutional change,” while strong sustainability “demands radical 
institutional and policy changes in order to maintain the total stock of natural capital including biological 
diversity, as well as ethical and cultural change as against mere technological and managerial solutions.”). 
 54. Kysar, supra n. 8, at 2118–19 (quoting Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law 
253 (2d ed., Cambridge U. Press 2003); accord Paul R. Ehrlich, Ecological Economics and the Carrying 
Capacity of Earth, in Investing in Natural Capital: The Ecological Economics Approach to Sustainability 38, 
49 (AnnMari Jansson et al. eds., Is. Press 1994)). 
 55. Cf. Our Common Future, supra n. 29, at ch. 1, ¶ 14 (recognizing that sustainability requires measures to 
preclude impairment of “the ecosystem’s overall integrity”). 
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the well-being of all life depends, are maintained indefinitely.”56  The environmental 
services provided by well-functioning ecological systems include purification of air and 
water, detoxification and decomposition of waste, renewal of soil fertility, regulation of 
climate, mitigation of droughts and floods, pest control, pollination of plants, 
proliferation of game and beneficial non-game species, recreational benefits, and cultural 
and aesthetic qualities.57  The capacity of an ecosystem to continue to provide these 
services depends on its resilience in the face of both natural disturbances and human use.  
Thus, a resilient ecosystem is one whose well-functioning natural capacity for self-
maintenance and self-regeneration allows it to continue to function.58  The goal of 
protecting ecosystem integrity is “‘not to keep things as they are, or to constrain 
ecosystems within historical bounds, but rather to retain the capability of the ecosystem 
to adapt,’”59 given that ecosystems are dynamic rather than stable.60  In short, the goal 
of sustainable land and resource management is to ensure that the ability of the managed 
ecosystems to continue to provide the valuable environmental services they currently 
provide remains unimpaired, notwithstanding natural disturbances and human use.61 
C. The Amorphous Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Statutes 
The version of sustainability reflected in the laws that govern land and resource 
management by the Forest Service and the BLM is sustained yield.  As George Coggins 
explained several years after the adoption of the organic statutes for those two agencies, 
 
 56. Prue Taylor, The Business of Climate Change: What’s Ethics Got to Do with It? 20 P. McGeorge 
Global Bus. & Dev. L.J. 161, 192 (2007).  An ecosystem is “a functional unit of physical and biological 
organization” with “recognized boundaries [and] some degree of internal homogeneity.”  Eugene Odum, The 
Emergence of Ecology as a New Discipline, 195 Sci. 1289, 1289–93 (1977) (quoted in Jan G. Laitos et al., Nat. 
Resources L. 74 (Thomson West 2006)).  On the role of ecosystem services, see generally James Salzman, 
Barton H. Thompson, Jr. & Gretchen Daily, Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 
Stan. Envtl. L.J. 309, 310 (2001); James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 Ecol. L.Q. 887 (1997); J.B. 
Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services, 22 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 
157 (2007). 
 57. Laitos et al., supra n. 56, at 75; Salzman, Thompson & Daily, supra n. 56, at 310.. 
 58. Taylor, supra n. 56, at 192.  Taylor adds that “[t]he impact of present behavior and the potential impact 
of future behavior give rise to the need to protect and conserve.  Additionally, the impact of past human 
behavior gives rise to the need to restore and rehabilitate ecological systems.”  Id. 
 59. Annecoos Wiersema, A Train without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in Environmental 
and Natural Resources Law, 38 Envtl. L. 1239, 1258 (2008) (quoting Preface to Ecosystem Function & Human 
Activities: Reconciling Economics and Ecology xiii (R. David Simpson & Norman L Christensen, Jr. eds., Intl. 
Thomson Publg. 1997) (emphasis in original). 
 60. See generally Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 
875 (1994). 
 61. Cf. Laitos et al., supra n. 56, at 75 (“Ecosystem management emphasizes the ecological health and 
integrity of interacting components of ecosystems, including their resiliency, stability, elasticity and 
persistence.”); Bryan G. Norton, A New Paradigm for Environmental Management, in Ecosystem Health: New 
Goals for Environmental Management 25 (Robert Costanza et al. eds., 1992) (quoted in Laitos et al., supra n. 
56, at 108); A. Dan Tarlock, Putting Rivers Back in the Landscape: The Revival of Watershed Management in 
the United States, 14 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L & Policy 1059, 1066 (2008) (arguing that protection of the 
ecological integrity of a river “is not a simple river preservation concept, but rather one that advocates 
integrating human use of a river system with the maintenance of its natural environmental sustainability”); 
Wiersema, supra n. 59, at 1260 (stating that “if we say we want to maintain ecosystem integrity, we can find 
out what connections are being disrupted and work on maintaining them”).  The Fish and Wildlife Service, the 
agency responsible for implementing the Endangered Species Act and for managing the national wildlife 
refuges, has defined ecological integrity as “a condition determined to be characteristic of an ecosystem that 
has the ability to maintain the function, structure, and abundance of natural biological communities, including 
rates of change in response to natural environmental variation.”  50 C.F.R. at § 404.3. 
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sustained yield, and its frequent partner, multiple use, provide a standard that, “[i]n spite 
of its . . . popularity, . . . is neither widely understood nor consistently applied in 
practice.”62  Unfortunately, that assessment continues to be accurate. 
1. The Origins of Sustained Yield 
The sustained yield mandate reflected in the current organic statutes for the Forest 
Service and the BLM dates back at least as far as the late 1800s.  In the 1890s, before the 
adoption of the Organic Act of 1897,63 Bernhard Fernow, the Chief of the Division of 
Forestry within the Department of Agriculture, stressed the importance of maintaining 
the future productivity of the national forests, and especially the timber they produce.64  
According to Fernow, “[t]wo considerations must always be kept in view in [timber] 
management, namely, the needs of the consumer and the condition, present and 
prospective, of the reserve.  The former should never be satisfied to the detriment of the 
latter, but all reasonable wants should be satisfied as far as possible.”65 
Based on this philosophy, the Division proposed a multiple use and sustained yield 
policy for managing the national forests that focused on water flow and timber supply, 
although the emphasis was economic, not preservationist in orientation.66  The 
instructions provided to local forest rangers by Gifford Pinchot, upon becoming Chief of 
the Forest Service, reflected this same utilitarian bent: 
The most vital question concerning the removal of any living timber is whether it can be 
spared.  To decide this question the approving officer must know whether another growth 
of timber will replace the one removed or whether the land will become waste, whether the 
water supply will suffer, and whether the timber is more urgently needed for some other 
purpose.  One of the foremost points to be studied is the reproduction of the forest under 
various conditions.  Wherever possible a stand of young, thrifty trees should be left to form 
the basis for a second crop.  Good reproduction and in mixed forests reproduction of the 
more valuable species must be assured before a sale can be recommended.67 
The concept of sustained yield was first codified in the Sustained-Yield Act of 
1944.68  The statute sought “to promote the stability of forest industries, of employment, 
of communities, and of taxable forest wealth.”69  As Professor Michael Blumm has 
indicated, the clear function of the mandate was “sustaining timber harvests, not 
sustaining timber resources.”70  “Even though Congress assumed that a sustained yield 
 
 62. George Cameron Coggins & Parthenia Blessing Evans, Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Planning on the 
Public Lands, 53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 411, 411–12 (1982).  See generally George Cameron Coggins, Of Succotash 
Syndromes and Vacuous Platitudes: The Meaning of “Multiple Use, Sustained Yield” for Public Land 
Management, 53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 229 (1982). 
 63. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473–481 (2006) (repealed in part 1976).  The 1897 statute “defined the basic purposes of 
national forest management.”  Coggins & Glicksman, supra n. 25, at § 6:17. 
 64. Charles F. Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in the National Forests, 64 
Or. L. Rev. 1, 47 (1985). 
 65. Id. at 47–48 n. 233 (quoting Rpt. of the Chief of the Div. of Forestry, Report of the Sec. of Agric., H.R. 
Exec. Doc. 1 pt. 6 52-1 at 224 (1891)). 
 66. Id. at 48 n. 238. 
 67. Id. at 133 (quoting Forest Serv., U.S. Dept. of Agric., The Use Book 43 (1907 ed.)). 
 68. Act of Mar. 29, 1944, 58 Stat. 132.  For a description of the statute, see James L. Huffman, A History of 
Forest Policy in the United States, 8 Envtl. L.239, 274 (1978). 
 69. Act of Mar. 29, 1944, 58 Stat. at 132. 
 70. Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why “Multiple Use” Failed, 18 Harv. 
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of timber would also benefit” other forest resources, such as wildlife and watersheds, the 
1944 Act amounted to an endorsement of timber production as the salient goal.71  
Sustained yield meant the generation of a stream of commodity products.72 
2. The Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act 
In 1960, Congress adopted the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act (MUSYA),73 
which supplemented the 1897 Organic Act, but did not supersede it as the source of the 
Forest Service’s management authority.74  MUSYA enunciates a congressional policy 
that the national forests be administered “for outdoor recreation, range, timber, 
watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.”75  The Act directs the Secretary of 
Agriculture “to develop and administer the renewable surface resources of the national 
forests for multiple use and sustained yield of the several products and services obtained 
therefrom.  In the administration of the national forests due consideration shall be given 
to the relative values of the various resources in particular areas.”76  It defines sustained 
yield to mean “the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or 
regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the national forests without 
impairment of the productivity of the land.”77  One can read MUSYA to emphasize 
commodity production, not resource preservation.  The word “yield” is evocative of 
tangible goods,78 not the value of the natural ecosystem functions that undeveloped land 
provides.79  So is the word “output.”80 
That reading is not inevitable.  MUSYA includes outdoor recreation, watershed, 
and fish and wildlife among the purposes for which the national forests shall be 
administered, but only in the hortatory policy provision.  The Act’s directive to the 
 
Envtl. L. Rev. 405, 424 (1994). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 426 (arguing that “multiple use and sustained yield had a bias in favor of commodity production 
well in advance of the enactment of MUSYA”). 
 73. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528–531 (2006). 
 74. Coggins & Glicksman, supra n. 25, at § 30:1; 16 U.S.C. § 528 (“The purposes of sections 528 to 531 of 
this title are declared to be supplemental to, but not in derogation of, the purposes for which the national forests 
were established as set forth in section 475 of this title.”). 
 75. 16 U.S.C. § 528. 
 76. Id. at § 529. 
 77. Id. at § 531(b). 
 78. See Am. Heritage Dictionary of the English Lang. 1995 (4th ed., 2000) (defining “yield” as “[a]n 
amount yielded or produced; a product”) [hereinafter Am. Heritage]; Merriam-Webster, Word Central, 
http://www.wordcentral.com (accessed Apr. 28, 2009) (defining “yield” as “product: especially: the amount or 
quantity produced or returned”).  The American Heritage online dictionary even defines “sustained yield” as 
either “[t]he continuing yield of a biological resource, such as timber from a forest, by controlled periodic 
harvesting” or “[t]he quantity of a resource harvested in this manner.”  The Am. Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Lang., www.bartleby.com/61/5/Y0020550.html (accessed Apr. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Am. Heritage 
Online]. 
 79. American courts have a long history of emphasizing the value of land and natural resources for 
commodity production rather than for the ecological benefits they provide in their undisturbed state.  See 
Alexandra B. Klass, Adverse Possession and Conservation: Expanding Traditional Notions of Use and 
Possession, 77 U. Colo. L. Rev.283 (2006); John G. Sprankling, The Anti-Wilderness Bias in American 
Property Law, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev.519 (1996); John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse 
Possession, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 816 (1994). 
 80. The first two definitions of “output” in the American Heritage dictionary are “[t]he act or process of 
producing; production,” and “[a]n amount produced or manufactured during a certain time.”  Am. Heritage 
Dictionary, supra n. 78, at 1250; Am. Heritage Online, supra n. 78, at http://www.bartleby.com/61/ 
57/O0165700.html. 
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Forest Service is to manage the national forests to achieve sustained yield of the 
“products and services” obtained from the national forests.  That mandate clearly 
includes ensuring a sustained yield of timber harvests and forage and easily 
accommodates efforts to achieve a continuous supply of fish and game for those engaged 
in fishing and hunting.  The statute also ought to encompass management to protect the 
continuing vitality of ecosystem services,81 but that term was not developed until nearly 
four decades after MUSYA was adopted.82  It would have been more easily understood 
at the time MUSYA was adopted to include making the national forests available for 
recreational pursuits, one of the listed multiple uses.  The statute also refers to the 
“values” of various forest resources, which would appear to encompass the ecological, 
historic, scientific, and even spiritual value of undeveloped forestland.83  Further, the 
definition of multiple use provides that the Forest Service, in considering these values 
and seeking to avoid impairment of forest resources, need not achieve “the combination 
of uses that will give the greatest dollar return or the greatest unit output.”84  But 
MUSYA only requires the agency to afford relative resource values “due 
consideration.”85  The directive to “consider” these values reflects a weaker mandate 
than the decree that the Forest Service develop and administer renewable forest resources 
for sustained yield of their products and services.86  The terminology of MUSYA’s 
sustained yield mandate, therefore, tilts toward commodity production rather than toward 
the protection of ecological integrity, one of the essential components of the core 
meaning of sustainability in the international law context described in Part II above.87  
As Professors Nagle and Ruhl have pointed out, “[g]iven their vastly different objectives, 
a commodity-based view of ecosystems is likely to adopt a much different metric for 
ecosystem management than will a preservation-based view.”88 
The other essential component of the international law concept of sustainability is 
the obligation of the present generation to protect the interests of future generations.89  
 
 81. For references to discussions of the value of ecosystem services, see supra n. 56. 
 82. According to J.B. Ruhl, “the birth of ecosystem services as a big ‘new’ idea” occurred in 1997 when 
three influential works were published.  J.B. Ruhl, The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services, 22 J. 
Land Use & Envtl. L. 157, 158 (2007) (citing Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems 3 
(Gretchen C. Daily ed., Is. Press 1997); Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, Economic Returns from the 
Biosphere, 391 Nat. 629 (Feb. 12, 1998); Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services 
and Natural Capital, 387 Nat. 253 (May 15, 1997)). 
 83. The Wilderness Act, which was passed four years after MUSYA, defines wilderness, in part, by 
reference to the “ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical 
value[,]” which undeveloped federal land preserved in its primitive condition may provide.  16 U.S.C. § 
1131(c)(4) (2006).  See generally John Copeland Nagle, The Spiritual Values of Wilderness, 35 Envtl. L. 955 
(2005). 
 84. 16 U.S.C. § 531(a). 
 85. Id. at § 529.  Professor Zellmer notes that, “[o]ther than this cryptic provision for ‘due consideration,’ 
however, MUSY [gives] little guidance to the agency for resolving conflicts among uses. . . .”  Sandra Zellmer, 
A Preservation Paradox: Political Prestidigitation and an Enduring Resource of Wilderness, 34 Envtl. L. 
1015, 1032 (2004). 
 86. See 16 U.S.C. § 529. 
 87. Cf. John Martin Gillroy, Breena Holland & Celia Campbell-Mohn, A Primer for Law & Policy Design: 
Understanding the Use of Principle and Argument in Environmental and Natural Resources Law 214 
(Thompson/West 2000) (stating that “[c]urrent natural resource statutes,” including MUSYA and the NFMA, 
“reflect this definition of sustainability as another form of Kaldor efficiency”). 
 88. John Copeland Nagle & J.B. Ruhl, The Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management 329 (2d ed., 
Found. Press 2006). 
 89. See supra n. 55 and accompanying text. 
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MUSYA does not refer to the interests of future generations explicitly.  It does, however, 
define “sustained yield” in part as “maintenance in perpetuity” of the “renewable 
resources of the national forests without impairment of the productivity of the land.”90  
Those references encompass recognition that the Forest Service has an obligation to 
manage the national forests for the long as well as the short term. 
3. The Insufficient Fix: The Two New Organic Acts of 1976 
As the fledgling environmental protection movement began to emerge, some 
members of Congress voiced dissatisfaction with MUSYA’s vague resource 
management mandate.  Congress did two things that year to lay the groundwork for the 
reorientation of federal land use priorities.  First, it adopted the Classification and 
Multiple Use Act of 1964 (CMUA).91  The CMUA required the Secretary of the Interior 
to develop criteria for determining whether particular public lands should be disposed of, 
committed to community growth and other public uses, or retained and managed for 
multiple use and sustained yield.92  Second, it created the Public Land Law Review 
Commission93to review the public land laws and make recommendations for revisions to 
Congress and the President.94  The Commission endorsed the fundamental principle that 
the federal government needed to “provid[e] responsible stewardship of the public lands 
and their resources.”95  According to the Commission, this principle required that 
“[e]nvironmental values . . . be protected as major permanent elements of public land 
policy.”96 
In 1976, Congress adopted both the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA)97 and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA),98 creating new organic 
acts for both the BLM and the Forest Service, respectively.  As the remainder of Part II 
indicates, both statutes require management of federal lands and resources in accordance 
with the principles of multiple use and sustained yield.  Both represent a movement away 
from the tilt toward commodity production reflected in the MUSYA and toward the 
protection of environmental values referred to by the Public Land Law Review 
Commission.  Part III demonstrates, however, that neither statute is adequate to protect 
these values on federal lands.  In particular, neither one contains management standards 
that are sufficient to preserve the capacity of those lands to provide a continued supply of 
ecosystem services.  Neither one requires or is likely to achieve sustainability, as this 
Article conceives of that term. 
 
 90. 16 U.S.C. § 531(b).  The definition of multiple use also includes the phrase “without impairment of the 
productivity of the land.”  Id. § 531(a). 
 91. Pub. L. No. 88-607, 78 Stat. 986 (1964).  That short-lived Act expired in 1970.  Coggins & Glicksman, 
supra n. 25, at § 30:1. 
 92. Coggins & Evans, supra n. 62, at 449. 
 93. Pub. L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982 (1964). 
 94. Jamison E. Colburn, Habitat and Humanity: Public Lands Law in the Age of Ecology, 39 Ariz. St. L.J. 
145, 179 n. 141 (2007)  (quoting Wayne N. Aspinall, The Public Land Law Review Commission: Origins and 
Goals, 7 Nat. Research J. 149, 149 (1967)). 
 95. Pub. Land L. Rev. Commn., Report of the Public Land Law Review Commission:  One Third of the 
Nation’s Land 7 (June 1970). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (1976) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1785 (2006)). 
 98. Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1687 (2006)). 
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a. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
FLPMA enunciates a national policy that “goals and objectives be established by 
law as guidelines for public land use planning and that management be on the basis of 
multiple use and sustained yield unless otherwise specified by law.”99  It mandates that, 
in developing and revising land use plans, the BLM “use and observe the principles of 
multiple use and sustained yield set forth in this and other applicable law.”100  It also 
provides that the agency “shall manage the public lands under principles of multiple use 
and sustained yield, in accordance with the land use plans developed by [it] under 
[FLPMA] when they are available.”101 
FLPMA’s definition of sustained yield is similar to the definition of that term in 
MUSYA.  For purposes of FLPMA, sustained yield means “the achievement and 
maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of the various 
renewable resources of the public lands consistent with multiple use.”102  The reference 
to output seems to continue the same commodity production orientation reflected in 
MUSYA.  The statute’s definition of multiple use, however, pulls FLPMA in a different 
direction that is more consistent with the core components of the international law 
version of sustainability discussed above.  Under FLPMA, multiple use means 
“management of the public lands and their various resource values so that they are 
utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the 
American people.”103  In addition, multiple use under FLPMA entails “a combination of 
balanced and diverse resource uses that takes into account the long-term needs of future 
generations for renewable and nonrenewable resources.”104  Both of those components 
of the definition of multiple use reflect the intergenerational equity concerns that play a 
prominent role in the meaning of sustainability under international law. 
FLPMA also defines the renewable and nonrenewable resources that the BLM 
must manage, so as to achieve balance and diversity of uses, to include not only the 
resources referred to in MUSYA—outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and 
wildlife and fish105—but also “natural scenic, scientific and historical values.”106  
Finally, FLPMA differs from MUSYA by clearly stating that the uses encompassed by 
the definition of multiple use may include uses other than those identified in the statutory 
definition.107  This inclusive provision is broad enough to include the value of 
preserving ecosystem integrity.  It is not as clear, however, that FLPMA mandates 
resource management to that end.  Finally, the FLPMA definition of multiple use differs 
subtly from the one in MUSYA in the portion of the definition that relates to impairment.  
 
 99. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7). 
 100. Id. at § 1712(c)(1). 
 101. Id. at § 1732(a).  If a tract of land subject to the jurisdiction of the BLM has been dedicated to specific 
uses under other laws, such as the Wilderness Act, the BLM must manage that land in accordance with the 
other law, notwithstanding FLPMA’s multiple use, sustained yield mandate. 
 102. Id. at § 1702(h) (2006). 
 103. Id. at § 1702(c) (emphasis added). 
 104. Id. 
 105. 16 U.S.C. § 528. 
 106. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c). 
 107. See id. (emphasis added) (providing that multiple use means “a combination of balanced and diverse 
resource uses . . . including, but not limited to” those set forth in the statutory definition). 
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MUSYA seeks to achieve “harmonious and coordinated management of the various 
resources, each with the other, without impairment of the productivity of the land.”108  
FLPMA defines multiple use to mean “harmonious and coordinated management . . . 
without permanent109 impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality of the 
environment.”110 
Careful parsing of FLPMA’s definitions of multiple use and sustained yield reflect 
differences from MUSYA’s definition of those terms.  FLPMA creates a management 
regime, for the public lands administered by the BLM, which places a greater emphasis 
on the agency’s obligation to protect the interests of future generations.  In addition, it 
replaces MUSYA’s emphasis on commodity protection with a conception of the long-
term protection of the value of the public lands that better accommodates “natural” 
values, such as the maintenance of ecosystem integrity.111 
b. The National Forest Management Act 
Congress also overhauled the organic act for the Forest Service by passing the 
National Forest Management Act of 1976.112  The NFMA does not accomplish the same 
shift away from a commodity production orientation that FLPMA’s definitional 
provisions arguably do, or at least does not do so to the same extent. 
The NFMA includes a finding that the national interest is served by a renewable 
resource program that is based on “a comprehensive assessment of present and 
anticipated uses, demand for, and supply of renewable resources from” the lands 
managed by the Forest Service.113  This management is to occur “through analysis of 
environmental and economic impacts, coordination of multiple use and sustained yield 
opportunities as provided in the [MUSYA].”114  To the extent that MUSYA reflects a 
bias toward commodity production, this cross-reference incorporates it into the NFMA 
as well.  As if to reinforce that bias, the statute refers in another finding to the “capacity 
to produce goods and services” as a significant characteristic of the nation’s private 
forests and rangelands before endorsing the federal government’s role in encouraging 
 
 108. 16 U.S.C. § 531(a). 
 109. MUSYA lacks the reference to permanent impairment.  On the one hand, the FLPMA version of 
multiple use may authorize a greater degree of short-term impairment, as long as permanent impairment does 
not occur.  On the other hand, the reference to permanent impairment may reflect the concerns for 
intergenerational equity referred to earlier in the definition of multiple use. 
 110. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (emphasis added).  FLPMA’s definition of multiple use repeats the language in 
MUSYA that requires that the BLM “consider[ ]” “relative values of the resources,” but “not necessarily . . . 
the combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or the greatest unit output.”  Id.  Cf. 43 
U.S.C. §1732(b) (requiring the BLM, in managing the public lands, to “take any action necessary to prevent 
unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands”). 
 111. Professor Zellmer notes the existence of debate over whether the multiple use, sustained yield standard 
as reflected in MUSYA, FLPMA, and the NFMA “has delivered on its promise of balancing the various 
interests in the public lands and sustaining the land and its resources for present and future generations. . . .”  
Zellmer, supra n. 85, at 1034.  She argues that, due to provisions such as those discussed above, as well as 
relatively specific management standards in the NFMA for activities such as clearcutting, 16 U.S.C. § 
1604(g)(3)(B), the multiple use, sustained yield standard “shows signs of having morphed beyond its 
production-oriented roots into something more like sustainable development, an overarching objective of 
international law norms.”  Zellmer, supra n. 85, at 1019.  See also id. at 1033, 1038. 
 112. Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976). 
 113. 16 U.S.C. § 1600(3). 
 114. Id. 
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and assisting private owners to achieve “the efficient long-term use and improvement of 
these lands and their renewable resources consistent with the principles of sustained 
yield and multiple use.”115  This finding seems to equate the production of goods and 
services with the desired efficiency that multiple use, sustained yield management is 
designed to achieve. 
The NFMA declares congressional policy to be maintenance of all forested lands 
in the National Forest System “in appropriate forest cover with species of trees, degree of 
stocking, rate of growth, and conditions of stand designed to secure the maximum 
benefits of multiple use sustained yield management in accordance with land 
management plans.”116  It directs the Forest Service to engage in a multi-level planning 
process whose major function is forest management that is consistent with multiple use, 
sustained yield principles.117  One level entails establishing planning objectives over a 
forty-year horizon for all Forest Service activities.118  The resulting program must 
include recommendations, which “evaluate objectives for the major Forest Service 
programs in order that multiple-use and sustained-yield relationships among and within 
the renewable resources can be determined.”119 
The NFMA requires the Forest Service, in developing and revising land and 
resource management plans for the national forests, to assure that those plans: 
(1) provide for multiple use and sustained yield of the products and services obtained 
therefrom in accordance with the [MUSYA], and, in particular, include coordination of 
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish, and wilderness; and 
(2) determine forest management systems, harvesting levels, and procedures in the light 
of . . . the definition of the terms “multiple use” and “sustained yield” as provided in the 
[MUSYA], and the availability of lands and their suitability for resource management.120 
The Act directs the Forest Service to “take such action as will assure that the 
development and administration of the renewable resources of the National Forest 
System are in full accord with the concepts for multiple use and sustained yield of 
products and services as set forth in the [MUSYA].”121  It provides that the Forest 
Service “shall limit the sale of timber from each national forest to a quantity equal to or 
less than a quantity which can be removed from such forest annually in perpetuity on a 
sustained-yield basis.”122  To the extent that MUSYA places commodity production at 
the top of the list of land and resource management goals for the national forests, the 
NFMA’s incorporation of MUSYA’s definitions of multiple use and sustained yield 
codify that same bias. 
Other, more specific substantive provisions of the NFMA cut in a more 
ecologically holistic direction.  The statute requires the Forest Service to promulgate 
regulations “under the principles of the [MUSYA]” that govern the development and 
 
 115. Id. § 1600(5). 
 116. Id. § 1601(d)(1). 
 117. See Coggins & Glicksman, supra n. 25, at § 16:33. 
 118. Id. 
 119. 16 U.S.C. § 1602(5)(A). 
 120. Id. at § 1604(e). 
 121. Id. at § 1607. 
 122. Id. at § 1611(a). 
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revision of land and resource management plans.123  These regulations require the 
agency to provide for diversity of plant and animal communities, but only “within the 
multiple-use objectives of a land management plan adopted” under MUSYA principles, 
and take steps to preserve the diversity of tree species similar to that existing in the 
region controlled by the plan, but only “to the degree practicable.”124  The NFMA’s 
requirement that the Forest Service protect the diversity of plant and animal communities 
has been interpreted as an effort to achieve ecosystem-based management of the national 
forests.125  But the multiple cross-references126 to MUSYA weaken the force this 
provision might have in moving away from the commodity-production slant of the 
MUSYA’s conception of sustained yield toward a management regime whose hallmark 
is the protection of ecosystem integrity. 
Other mandatory components of the Forest Service’s planning regulations reflect 
Congress’s desire to ensure that the Forest Service not manage the national forests solely 
on the basis of its traditional goal of “getting out the cut.”127  The NFMA mandates that 
the Forest Service restrict the location of timber harvesting to insure that it will not 
irreversibly damage soil, slope, or other watershed conditions; that harvested lands can 
be restocked within five years; that harvesting will not seriously and adversely affect 
water conditions or fish habitat; and that the harvesting system not be “selected primarily 
because it will give the greatest dollar return or the greatest unit output of timber.”128  It 
also restricts clearcutting and related timber harvesting practices, requiring, among other 
things, that these methods be carried out “in a manner consistent with the protection of 
soil, watershed, fish, wildlife, recreation, and esthetic resources, and the regeneration of 
the timber resource.”129  All of these mandates, however, are circumscribed by the 
proviso that the Forest Service operate “under the principles of the [MUSYA.]”130  
Finally, the NFMA states that, in developing land use plans, the Forest Service must 
identify lands that are not suited for timber production, “considering physical, economic, 
and other . . . factors to the extent feasible  . . . and shall assure that, except for . . . sales 
 
 123. Id. at § 1604(g). 
 124. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B).  For further discussion of the diversity mandate, see generally Robert L. 
Glicksman, Bridging Data Gaps through Modeling and Evaluation of Surrogates: Use of the Best Available 
Science to Protect Biological Diversity Under the National Forest Management Act, 83 Ind. L.J. 465 (2008). 
 125. See Glicksman, supra n. 124, at 489 (citing Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing 
a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 293, 309–10 (1994)). 
 126. The introductory portion of 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g) refers to MUSYA, and 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) 
refers to multiple-use (as defined by MUSYA) objectives twice more. 
 127. See William deBuys, Visions of Western Governance: Powell and His Successors, 23  J. Land, 
Resources, & Envtl. L. 15, 17–18 (2003) (arguing that even though “the Forest Service no longer follows 
Washington-based directives about ‘getting out the cut,’ . . . some of the characteristics of behavior born in 
those days still hamper the work of . . . the Forest Service”); Stephen L. Yaffee, Lessons About Leadership 
from the History of the Spotted Owl Controversy, 35 Nat. Resources J. 381, 394 (1995) (describing getting out 
this year’s cut as traditionally the most important goal of the leadership of the Forest Service).  See generally 
Paul W. Hirt, Getting out the Cut: A History of the National Forest Management in the Northern Rockies, in 
Northwest Lands, Northwest People 437 (Dale D. Goble & Paul W. Hirt eds., 1999). 
 128. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(iv). 
 129. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(v).  This provision is another reflection of the manner in which FLPMA represents a 
greater departure from MUSYA’s production-oriented conception of sustained yield than the NFMA does.  The 
list of resources to be protected under the NFMA’s clearcutting restrictions does not include “natural scenic, 
scientific and historical values,” as FLPMA’s definition of multiple use does.  43 U.S.C. § 1702(c).  In 
addition, the NFMA’s clearcutting provision does not provide, as the same FLPMA definition does, that the 
resources the agency is authorized to consider are not limited to those listed in the statute. 
 130. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g) (introductory language). 
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necessitated to protect . . . multiple-use values, no timber harvesting shall occur on such 
lands for a period of 10 years.”131  The feasibility proviso obviously weakens this 
decree, and the cross-reference to MUSYA again precludes the Forest Service (or those 
protesting the agency’s actions) from achieving a clean break from MUSYA’s 
commodity-driven core.132 
One statutory provision governing the Forest Service has the potential to broaden 
the agency’s management mandate beyond that provided by MUSYA’s version of 
multiple use and sustained yield.  The Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources 
Planning Act of 1974 includes a provision in which “Congress declare[d] that the 
National Forest System consists of units of federally owned forest, range, and related 
lands throughout the United States and its territories, united into a nationally significant 
system dedicated to the long-term benefit for present and future generations.”133  That 
provision, which is codified along with the land and resource planning provisions of the 
NFMA,134 includes an explicit mandate to promote intergenerational equity.  To that 
extent, it represents a step forward from MUSYA.  In addition, the description of the 
National Forest System is not limited to products and services, as some of the provisions 
of the NFMA are,135 and does not rely on a yardstick tied to output, as MUSYA’s 
definition of sustained yield does.136  Instead, the reference to “long-term benefit” leaves 
room for the Forest Service to place greater emphasis on less quantifiable goals, 
including the benefits to present and future generations of preserving ecological 
integrity.  The legislative history of this provision, however, explains that it is “in full 
accord with the concepts for multiple use and sustained yield of products and services as 
set forth in the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960.”137 
 
 131. Id. at § 1604(k). 
 132. For further discussion of the NFMA provisions summarized in this paragraph, see generally Coggins & 
Glicksman, supra n. 25, at §§ 16:52–16:59; Wilkinson & Anderson, supra n. 64, at 159–200. 
 133. Pub. L. No. 93-378, § 10, 88 Stat. 476 (1974) (emphasis added). 
 134. 16 U.S.C. § 1609(a). 
 135. E.g. id. at § 1600(5). 
 136. Id. at § 531(b). 
 137. S. Rep. 93-686 (Feb. 18, 1974) (reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4060, 4075).  Other federal statutes, 
many but not all of which relate to federal land management, refer to sustainability or sustained yield.  These 
laws are redolent with references to sustained yield.  Yet, each either provides no definition of the term at all or 
simply refers to the MUSYA definition.  See e.g. 16 U.S.C. § 460ff-3(f)(2) (zoning laws applicable to the 
Cuyahoga Valley National Park); id. at § 460l-22(b) (limitations on exchanges of timber lands in the national 
parks); id. at § 471f (establishment of the Pisgah National Forest); id. at § 471j(c) (acquisition of land for the 
Headwaters Forest and Elk River Property); id. at § 539d(a), (f) (providing timber from the Tongass National 
Forest); 16 U.S.C. § 580m (provision of timber supplies from reservoir areas of projects for flood control, 
navigation, hydroelectric power development); id. at § 583 (establishment of cooperative sustained-yield units 
consisting of federally owned or administered forest land); id. at §583a (cooperative agreements with private 
owners of forest land within a cooperative sustained-yield unit); id. at §§ 583b to 583i (creation of sustained-
yield unit consisting of forest land under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agriculture or Interior); id. at § 
693b (establishment of the Robert S. Kerr Memorial Arboretum and Nature Center in the Ouachita National 
Forest); 16 U.S.C. §§ 698v to 698v-6 (establishment of the Valles Caldera National Preserve at the Baca 
Ranch). 
  The statutes that govern management of land by the federal government that is held in trust for Native 
Americans require that the federal government manage these lands in accordance with the principles of 
sustained yield.  See e.g. 25 U.S.C. § 3104(b)(1), (3) (2006).  See also id. at § 407 (sale of timber on unallotted 
Indian trust land); id. at. § 466 (management of Indian forestry units); id. at § 564w-1 (management of the 
Klamath Indian Forest and Klamath Marsh); id. at § 632 (management of renewable resources on Navajo and 
Hopi lands); 25 U.S.C. § 3112(a) (requiring establishment of a program of technical assistance to Alaskan 
Native corporations to promote the sustained yield management of forest resources); id. at § 3702(1) 
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c. The Incomplete Movement toward Sustainability 
The concept of sustained yield management originated in the early days of the 
Forest Service and took full flower with the adoption of MUSYA in 1960.  Congress 
adopted FLPMA and the NFMA in the middle of the environmental decade when 
Congress’s stated priorities shifted to afford greater weight to the benefits of protecting 
the environment and the nation’s natural resource base.138  Although those two laws 
represented a partial break with MUSYA’s emphasis on protecting the ability of the 
federal lands to continue to produce commodities such as timber, key statutory 
provisions remain susceptible to interpretations that subordinate protection of ecological 
integrity to other, more commodity-driven goals.  Accordingly, neither FLPMA nor the 
NFMA fully reconceptualized the sustained yield component of the basic management 
directive governing the BLM and the Forest Service.139 
In one respect, FLPMA represented a sharper break from the commodity-driven 
orientation of MUSYA than the NFMA did.  Its definitions of multiple use and sustained 
yield, particularly the former, emphasize both intergenerational equity and ecosystem 
integrity protection components more than its MUSYA predecessors did.  In another 
respect, the NFMA provides a greater opportunity for moving toward those goals by 
including more specific and binding guidance to the Forest Service on how to manage 
particular resources than FLPMA does.  The NFMA qualifies many of those directives, 
however, both by reference to MUSYA’s definitions of multiple use and sustained yield, 
and through its feasibility and practicability provisos.140  As a result, neither statute fully 
captures the goals of achieving intergenerational equity and mandating preservation of 
the ecological integrity of federal lands and resources that ought to provide the focus of 
managing lands and resources for sustainability.141  The two agencies remain free to 
push land and resource management on the multiple use, sustained yield lands back 
toward the pre-1976 conception of appropriate federal land policy.  As Part III shows, 
they have in fact done so at times, and the statutory frameworks tends to result in 
deferential review of land management decisions that fail to protect the long-term flow 
of ecosystem services. 
III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXISTING SUSTAINED YIELD MANDATE 
The discussion above illustrates that both FLPMA and the BLM can reasonably be 
 
(American Indian Agricultural Resource Management).  They also define the term “sustained yield,” although 
not very helpfully, as “the yield of forest products that a forest can produce continuously at a given intensity of 
management” for purposes of National Indian forest resource management.  Id. at § 3103(14). 
 138. See Joseph A. Siegel, Terrorism and Environmental Law: Chemical Facility Site Security vs. Right-to-
Know? 9 Widener L. Symposium J. 339, 366 (2004) (referring to the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969, as “the law that ushered in the ‘environmental decade’ when our Nation’s modern environmental laws 
began to take shape”); A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There in Environmental Law? 19 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 
213, 232 (2004) (“The major achievements of the environmental decade, the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, 
the Endangered Species Act, and the ‘Superfund’ are justly celebrated as a major shift in United States resource 
policy.”). 
 139. Michael Blumm contends, for example, that “[i]t is clear that the concepts of multiple use and sustained 
yield have failed to produce sustainable public land ecosystems supporting a variety of renewable resources.”  
Blumm, supra n. 70, at 429. 
 140. See supra nn. 113–37 and accompanying text. 
 141. See Laitos et al., supra n. 56, at 84 (concluding that Congress has afforded a higher priority in the 
federal land management statutes to economic development than to ecosystem integrity). 
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interpreted to allow the multiple use agencies to emphasize resource extraction and 
commodity production, even if those activities create barriers to the achievement of long-
term sustainability.  This part demonstrates that the two agencies have actually pursued 
that kind of short-term agenda, though not all the time, and that the provisions of the two 
organic statutes provide insufficiently detailed mandates to enable litigants to convince 
the courts to force agencies to conform to the vision of sustainability reflected in 
international environmental law. 
According to at least one account, the multiple use agencies rarely emphasize the 
sustained yield mandate reflected in FLPMA and the NFMA in managing the lands and 
resources under their jurisdiction.  The BLM, in particular, appears to have largely 
ignored its responsibility under FLPMA to manage on a sustained yield basis despite 
FLPMA’s apparently clearer break from the MUSYA tradition than that intended by the 
NFMA.142  This Part first inquires how the Forest Service and the BLM have interpreted 
and applied the sustained yield mandate, under which they both operate, in the 
regulations they have adopted under FLPMA and the NFMA.  It then analyzes litigation 
in which the courts have addressed the meaning and legal significance of the sustained 
yield management standard.  The assessment of both the agencies’ regulations and the 
judicial decisions addressing issues relating to sustained yield shows that neither law has 
fully achieved the preservation of ecological integrity or protected intergenerational 
equity to the extent envisioned by this Article’s conception of sustainability. 
The following discussion reveals that both the BLM and the Forest Service 
describe their missions to include protecting the lands and resources they manage so that 
they will be capable of meeting the needs of both present and future generations.  Both 
have at times committed to a version of sustainability that looks beyond the “productive” 
capacity of the public lands, narrowly defined as commodity maximization, and that 
includes preserving ecological health and diversity.  The history of the implementation of 
the Forest Service’s planning regulations shows, however, that the agencies may easily 
shift the focus of such commitments toward resource extraction and commodity 
maximization, and the agencies have in fact done so on occasion.  Judicial review under 
the current statutes is unlikely to prevent future repeat performances. 
A. Unsustainable Agency Regulations 
The regulations of both the BLM and the Forest Service purport to implement the 
sustained yield mandate under which they operate.  The BLM’s regulations reflect the 
commodity-production orientation built into MUSYA rather than the two principal 
components of sustainability identified in Part II—promoting intergenerational equity by 
protecting ecological integrity.143  The Forest Service, in its planning regulations, has 
identified ecological sustainability as a management goal, but has been inconsistent in 
the emphasis it has placed on that goal in relation to other decision making frameworks 
for managing the national forests. 
 
 142. Coggins & Glicksman, supra n. 25, at § 30:4. 
 143. See infra n. 55 and accompanying text. 
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1. The BLM Regulations 
The BLM describes its mission in terms that are more consistent with this Article’s 
recommended version of sustainability for federal land management than with the 
narrower version codified in FLPMA’s definition of sustained yield: “Working with its 
partners at the local, state, and national levels, the BLM will meet its mission of 
sustaining the health, diversity, and productivity of the public lands for the use and 
enjoyment of present and future generations.”144  The agency’s recognition of its 
obligation to contribute to intergenerational equity is clear in the reference to future 
generations.  Further, the agency defines its mission to extend beyond sustaining 
resource productivity.  Instead, it commits to preserving resource health and diversity as 
well as resource productivity.  That portion of the mission statement reflects FLPMA’s 
definition of multiple use, which entails managing to prevent impairment of 
environmental quality as well as resource “productivity.”145 
The BLM has restated this vision of its raison d’être elsewhere.  In providing 
public notice of the availability of one of its resource management plans, for example, 
the BLM described its “mission” as “sustain[ing] the health, diversity, and productivity 
of the public lands it manages for the use and enjoyment of present and future 
generations.”146  It also stated in the preamble to its regulations governing livestock 
grazing on the public lands that: 
Long-term stewardship of public lands is inherent in the stated missions and goals of the 
agency in Section 102(a) of FLPMA.  There are also many sections . . . in the grazing 
regulations that provide mechanisms for exercising stewardship of the public lands to 
ensure that the lands are productive and available to future generations.  Additionally, the 
concept is embodied in BLM’s mission statement: “sustains the health, diversity, and 
productivity of the public lands for the use and enjoyment of present and future 
generations.”147 
In such statements, the BLM has professed its commitment to intergenerational equity 
and protection of resource health and diversity, as well as the productivity of the lands 
and resources it manages. 
But the BLM’s regulations include a direct reference to “future generations” only 
twice.  First, the regulations incorporate the definition of “multiple use” found in 
FLPMA.148  Second, they provide that lands may be classified for retention under the 
CMUA if they are not suitable for disposal and are capable of achieving several goals, 
which include providing “needed recreation, conservation, and scenic areas and open 
space . . . and assurance of adequate outdoor recreation resources for present and future 
generations of Americans.”149  The myriad references to multiple use management in the 
 
 144. Dept. of the Int., Bureau of Land Mgt., About the BLM, http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/ 
About_BLM.html (last updated Mar. 11, 2009). 
 145. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c). 
 146. Dept. of the Int., Bureau of Land Mgt., Notice of Availability of Record of Decision for the Eagle Lake 
Resource Management Plan, 73 Fed. Reg. 24086, 24086 (May 1, 2008). 
 147. Dept. of the Int., Bureau of Land Mgt.,  Grazing Administration−Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. Reg. 
39402, 39478 (July 12, 2006). 
 148. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(i) (2008). 
 149. Id. at § 2420.2(b)(5) (2008).  The regulation cites the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 460l–460l-11.  That statute “declares it to be desirable that all American people of present and future 
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regulations incorporate FLPMA’s references to the needs of future generations, the 
prevention of impairment of environmental quality, and the various values served by the 
public lands.150  But the BLM’s definition of sustained yield, like FLPMA’s, stresses 
nonimpairment of land productivity.151 
BLM regulations incorporate FLPMA’s general multiple use, sustained yield 
mandate into specific resource management contexts.  The agency’s regulations 
governing minerals management, for example, state that § 302 of FLPMA152 “provides 
the general authority for BLM to manage the use, occupancy, and development of the 
public lands under the principles of multiple use and sustained yield in accordance with 
the land use plans that BLM develops under FLPMA.”153  BLM regulations governing 
grazing regulations require management “in a manner consistent with land use plans, 
multiple use, sustained yield, environmental values, economic and other objectives stated 
in” FLPMA, among other laws.154 
The BLM’s regulations, therefore, reflect a commitment to promoting 
intergenerational equity and to promoting the health and diversity, in addition to the 
“productivity,” of the lands and resources under its stewardship, either explicitly or 
through its many references to FLPMA’s definition of multiple use.  As section B below 
indicates, however, in practice these commitments have done little to constrain the 
BLM’s management discretion or provide a basis for challenging particular BLM 
decisions as inconsistent with sustainable land and resource use. 
2. The Forest Service Regulations 
The mission statement of the Forest Service is similar to that of the BLM.  The 
Forest Service states that its mission “is to sustain the health, diversity, and productivity 
of the Nation’s forests and grasslands to meet the needs of present and future 
generations.”155  This mission includes “[p]rotecting and managing the National Forests 
and Grasslands so they best demonstrate the sustainable multiple-use management 
concept.”156  If that “concept” is the one that has governed the Forest Service since the 
adoption of MUSYA, it may harken back to the commodity orientation of that law.  The 
Forest Service also defines its mission, however, to include “[a]dvocating a conservation 
ethic in promoting the health, productivity, diversity, and beauty of forests and 
associated lands.”157  That vision of promoting intergenerational equity clearly extends 
 
generations be assured adequate outdoor recreation resources.”  Id. at § 460l. 
 150. See 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (defining “multiple use” by reference to all of these elements). 
 151. 43 C.F.R. § 2400.0-5(p) (2008) (“Sustained yield of the several products and services means the 
achievement and maintenance of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of the various renewable 
resources of land without impairment of the productivity of the land.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 152. 43 U.S.C. § 1732. 
 153. 43 C.F.R. § 3601.3(b) (2008). 
 154. Id. at § 4100.0-2(b).  See also id. at § 4100.0-8 (“The authorized officer shall manage livestock grazing 
on public lands under the principle of multiple use and sustained yield, and in accordance with applicable land 
use plans.”). 
 155. U.S. Forest Serv., About Us—Mission, http://www.fs.fed.us/aboutus/mission.shtml (last updated Oct. 
23, 2008). 
 156. Id 
 157. Id.  See also Dept. Agric., Natl. Forest Serv., Natl. Forest Sys. Land Mgt. Plan., Notice of proposed 
rule, request for comments, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514, 48515 (Aug. 23, 2007) (asserting that proposed planning rule 
would “better allow[] the Agency to carry out its mission ‘to sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of 
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beyond maximization of forest products such as timber harvests. 
The management orientation of the Forest Service’s regulations is not as clear.  
The agency’s current planning regulations158 provide that, 
[c]onsistent with the [MUSYA] . . . , the overall goal of managing the [NFS] is to sustain 
the multiple uses of its renewable resources in perpetuity while maintaining the long-term 
productivity of the land.  Resources are to be managed so they are utilized in the 
combination that will best meet the needs of the American people.  Maintaining or 
restoring the health of the land enables the [NFS] to provide a sustainable flow of uses, 
benefits, products, services, and visitor opportunities.159 
On the one hand, the cross-reference to MUSYA’s version of multiple use and 
sustained yield and its use of the term “productivity” appears to conform to MUSYA’s 
narrow version of sustainability, rather than the broader one envisioned in the Forest 
Service mission statement.  On the other hand, the regulations refer to restoration of land 
health (albeit not to diversity).  They also recognize that land and resource health is a 
prerequisite to ensuring a sustainable flow of multiple uses, products, services (which 
can be construed to include ecosystem services), and any other “benefits” that the 
national forests are capable of providing.  Thus, ecosystem health and diversity go hand 
in hand with land and resource productivity.  The Committee of Scientists convened 
during the Clinton Administration160 as part of the process of overhauling the agency’s 
planning regulations put it this way: 
[S]ustainability in [the] modern sense161 has three aspects: ecological, economic, and 
social.  These different aspects of sustainability are interrelated: the sustainability of 
ecological systems is a necessary prerequisite for strong, productive economies; enduring 
human communities; and the values people seek from wildlands.  Most basically, we 
compromise human welfare if we fail to sustain vital, functioning ecological systems.  It is 
also true that strong economies and communities are often a prerequisite to societies 
possessing the will and patience needed to sustain ecological systems.162 
 
the Nation’s forests and grasslands to meet the needs of present and future generations’”). 
 158. The Forest Service overhauled its planning regulations both in 2000 and 2005.  Dept. Agric., Natl. 
Forest Serv., Natl. Forest Sys. Land and Resource Mgt. Plan., 65 Fed. Reg. 67514 (Nov. 9, 2000); Dept. Agric., 
Natl. Forest Serv., Natl. Forest Sys. Land and Resource Mgt. Plan., Removal of 2000 Planning Rule, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 1022 (Jan. 5, 2005).  The 2005 regulations were invalidated on the basis of the Forest Service’s failure to 
comply with the procedural requirements of NEPA and the Endangered Species Act.  Citizens for Better 
Forestry v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2007), motion to amend denied, No. C 05-
114 PJH, 2007 WL 1970096 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2007).  The next year, the Forest Service reissued its planning 
regulations.  Dept. Agric., Natl. Forest Serv., Natl. Forest Sys. Land Mgt. Plan., Final rule and record of 
decision, 73 Fed. Reg. 21468 (Apr. 21, 2008) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.1–219.16 (2009)).  The 2008 
regulations are identical in most important respects to the invalidated 2005 regulations.  The references in this 
article to the current regulations are to the 2008 version of the regulations.  See Dept. Agric., Natl. Forest Serv., 
Natl. Forest Sys. Land Mgt. Plan., Notice of proposed rule, request for comments, 72 Fed. Reg. 48521 (Aug. 
23, 2007) (“The proposed rule is identical to the 2005 planning rule for social, economic, and ecological 
sustainability requirements.”). 
 159. 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(b) (2008). 
 160. In December 1997, the Secretary of Agriculture, Dan Glickman, appointed a Committee of Scientists 
for the purpose of developing recommendations for improvements in the planning process for the national 
forests.  Wilkinson, supra n. 7, at 308. 
 161. The Committee, relying on the Brundtland Commission report, defined the “modern” use of 
sustainability as “meet[ing] the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs.”  Scientists, supra n. 2, at 13. 
 162. Id. 
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Other provisions of the Forest Service regulations seem more narrowly geared 
toward the older, commodity-oriented definition of sustainability.  The regulations state, 
for example, that management plans for timber resources must “[b]e designed to aid in 
providing a continuous supply of national forest timber for the use and necessities of the 
citizens of the United States” and “[b]e based on the principle of sustained yield, with 
due consideration to the condition of the area and the timber stands covered by the 
plan.”163 
Its mission statement notwithstanding, the Forest Service’s commitment to 
implementing a broader version of sustainability than the one derived from MUSYA has 
been inconsistent.  In 2000, when the Forest Service adopted its first comprehensive 
revision of the regulations (initially adopted in 1982) that govern land and resource 
management planning, it identified three different types of sustainability: ecological, 
economic, and social.  Like the Committee of Scientists report that paved the way for the 
2000 regulations, the Forest Service recognized that the three types are 
interdependent.164  The agency chose under the Clinton Administration to declare long-
term ecological sustainability to be the first priority of forest planning and management 
because “it is essential that uses of today do not impair the functioning of ecological 
processes and the ability of these natural resources to contribute to sustainability in the 
future.”165  The regulations define ecological sustainability as the maintenance of 
ecosystems, including the diversity of plant and animal communities and the productive 
capacity of ecological systems.166  One court later characterized this emphasis as a 
change in the Forest Service’s mission from “multiple use” to “ecological sustainability” 
management.167  At about the same time, the Forest Service issued regulations to govern 
the management of roadless areas in the national forests.  In doing so, it described its 
responsibility in general terms as “managing National Forest System resources to sustain 
the health, diversity, and productivity of the nation’s forests and grasslands to meet the 
needs of present and future generations.”168 
The decision of the Forest Service in 2000 to elevate protection of ecological 
sustainability above the other two “aspects” conformed to the recommendations of the 
Committee of Scientists convened by the Clinton Administration to pave the way for an 
overhaul of the agency’s 1982 planning regulations.  Professor Charles Wilkinson, a 
member of the Committee, explained that choice: 
 The Committee report goes beyond most statements of sustainability in that it gives 
primacy to one of the three components—ecological sustainability.  This “ranking” is not 
 
 163. 36 C.F.R.§ 221.3(a) (2008). 
 164. The 2000 planning rules defined sustainability as “composed of interdependent ecological, social, and 
economic elements [embodying] the principles of multiple-use and sustained-yield without impairment to the 
productivity of the land.”  36 C.F.R. § 219.1(b)(3) (2003). 
 165. Id. at § 219.2.  See also Robert Keiter, Ecological Concepts, Legal Standards, and Public Land Law, 44 
Nat. Resources J. 943, 964 (2004) (stating that “the Clinton administration’s 2000 NFMA planning regulations 
gave priority to ecological sustainability over economic and social sustainability for forest management 
purposes”) 
 166. 36 C.F.R. § 219.36 (2003). 
 167. Wyo. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1211 (D. Wyo. 2003), vacated and remanded as 
moot, 414 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 168. Dept. Agric., Natl. Forest Serv., Special Areas, Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3244 
(Jan. 12, 2001). 
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due to a sense that the ecological component is somehow more important than the 
economic and social components (obviously, economic and social well-being is of great 
importance to people).  Rather, the reasoning is that, in order for social and economic 
benefits to be sustainable, they must depend upon the integrity of the water, soil, 
vegetation, and air that healthy ecosystems provide.  Put differently, the Committee clearly 
expects that the national forests will continue to provide economic goods and services, but 
it also believes that an environmental baseline should first be established to ensure that 
such economic benefits can be provided over time.  Refining the idea of sustainability in 
this way gives an edge to the doctrine and offers guidance to land managers in a way that a 
policy like multiple use-sustained yield management cannot.169 
The Committee itself proffered its conviction that “ecological sustainability lays a 
necessary foundation for national forests and grasslands to contribute to the economic 
and social components of sustainability, making contributions to strong, productive 
economies and creating opportunities for enduring human communities.”170 
The 2008 planning regulations, issued during the second presidential term of 
George W. Bush, also reflect a commitment to sustainability and intergenerational 
equity.  The preamble to the 2008 regulations explain that the rules “set[] the stage for a 
planning process that can be responsive to the desires and needs of present and future 
generations of Americans, for the multiple uses of NFS lands.”171  The preamble to the 
proposed version of those planning rules stated that “[s]ustaining the productivity of the 
land and its renewable resources means meeting present needs without compromising the 
ability of those lands and resources to meet the needs of future generations.”172  But the 
regulations themselves place little actual emphasis on promoting sustainability.173  What 
is more, the Bush Forest Service planning rules elevate the economic and social 
components of sustainability to the same level of importance as ecological sustainability, 
“thus reasserting the productive dimensions of the national forest mission.”174 
 
 169. Wilkinson, supra n. 7, at 313.  Cf. Coggins & Glicksman, supra, n. 25, at § 30:4 (urging, “at a 
minimum, that management of renewable resources should be aimed at achieving a long-term equilibrium in 
which each of the resources will be a prominent part or contributor”). 
 170. Scientists, supra n. 2, at 146.  See id. at 175 (arguing that “[t]o assure the continuation of this array of 
benefits, sustainability should be the guiding star for stewardship of the national forests and grasslands”). 
 171. Dept. of Agric., Natl. Forest Serv., Natl. Forest Sys. Land Mgt. Plan., Final rule and record of decision, 
73 Fed. Reg. 21468, 21477–78 (Apr. 21, 2008).  The Forest Service replaced the 2000 planning rules with the 
2005 version before the agency adopted or revised any land use plans using the 2000 regulations.  See Coggins 
& Glicksman, supra n. 25, at § 16:36. 
 172. 72 Fed. Reg. at 48521. 
 173. See Robert L. Glicksman, Traveling in Opposite Directions: Roadless Area Management under the 
Clinton and Bush Administrations, 34 Envtl. L. 1143, 1175 (2004) (describing the proposed version of the 2005 
final planning regulations). 
 174. Keiter, supra n. 165, at 964 (discussing the proposed version of the 2005 planning regulations).  See 
also Coggins & Glicksman, supra n. 25, at § 16:45 (asserting that the shift in terminology between the Clinton 
and Bush rules “appears to allow planners to place greater emphasis on the social and economic as opposed to 
the ecological component of sustainability”).  The Interior Department’s Bureau of Indian Affairs also has 
issued regulations that reflect a commodity-oriented view of sustainable resource management.  See e.g. 25 
C.F.R. § 163.1 (2009) (“Sustained yield means the yield of forest products that a forest can produce 
continuously at a given intensity of management.”) (emphasis omitted); id. at § 166.4 (“Sustained yield means 
the yield of agricultural products that a unit of land can produce continuously at a given level of use.”) 
(emphasis omitted).  The Supreme Court has interpreted the Bureau’s mandate in similar terms.   See U.S. v. 
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 209 (1983) (“Congress has directed the Secretary to adhere to principles of sustained-
yield forestry on all Indian forest lands under his supervision.”); White Mt. Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 
136, 149 (1980) (noting “the overriding federal objective of guaranteeing Indians that they will ‘receive . . . the 
benefit of whatever profit [the forest] is capable of yielding.’”). 
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That difference in emphasis also appears elsewhere in the two sets of regulations.  
The 2000 regulations began by reciting the Forest Service’s commitment to the 
“stewardship of the natural resources” of the national forests.175  The more recent 
regulations begin instead with a commitment to the “overall goal of managing the 
[National Forest System] . . . to sustain the multiple uses of its renewable resources.”176  
The 2000 regulations recognize not only the uses, products, and services that the national 
forests provide, but also the important “values” the forests reflect and the “intangible 
benefits” they provide, including “beauty, inspiration, and wonder.”177  The stated goal 
of the current regulations is to achieve “a sustainable flow of uses, benefits, products, 
services, and visitor opportunities.”178  These differences in terminology are consistent 
with “a subtle shift toward the commoditization of the national forests.”179 
The replacement of the Forest Service’s 2000 planning regulations with the 2008 
version illustrates the potential for the multiple use agencies to interpret their statutory 
mandates in ways that hearken back to the commodity-driven emphasis of MUSYA.  In 
these and other instances during the Bush Administration, both agencies apparently 
interpreted the multiple use laws to allow them to substitute maximization of short-term 
commodity production (such as timber, forage, and minerals) for a commitment to 
assuring that the full array of public land uses and values that are available now continue 
to be available to future generations through the preservation of ecological integrity.  The 
2008 planning regulations are under judicial challenge.  If a court reverses those 
regulations on the merits, the result may be to put some teeth into the ecological integrity 
component of the sustained yield mandate.180  Cases to date provide little assurance of 
that result.  Section B below reveals that the courts for the most part have not interpreted 
the multiple use, sustained yield statutes in a manner that binds the two agencies to any 
particular version of sustainability, no less the one that emphasizes preservation of 
ecosystem services for the benefit of present and future generations. 
B. Judicial Review of the Application of the Sustainability Provisions Lacks Teeth 
Although the courts have rendered numerous decisions under the multiple use 
sustained yield statutes,181 relatively few cases have required the courts to determine 
whether BLM or Forest Service actions conform to the basic mandate that they manage 
in accordance with multiple use, sustained yield principles.  The cases that do involve 
such determinations reflect a general judicial disinclination to interpret the multiple use, 
sustained yield statutes in a manner that creates meaningful and enforceable restrictions 
 
 175. 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(a) (2003). 
 176. 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(b) (2008). 
 177. 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(b)(1) (2003). 
 178. 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(b) (2008). 
 179. Coggins & Glicksman, supra n. 25, at § 16:45. 
 180. A federal district court in California struck down the Bush Administration’s first effort to revamp the 
NFMA planning rules on the ground that the agency failed to comply with the procedures of NEPA or the 
Endangered Species Act in promulgating them.  The court did not address the substantive validity of the rules 
under the NFMA.  See supra n. 158. 
 181. One court, for example, noted that the requirements in MUSYA and the NFMA that the Forest Service 
carry out commercial timber sales in accordance with the “sustained yield formula . . . produces constant 
litigation between environmental groups and the Forest Service.”  Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F. 
Supp. 2d 1268, 1272 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
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on the discretion of the Forest Service and the BLM.182  The deference that the courts 
have accorded the agencies has resulted from a long tradition of deferential review of 
implementation of the federal land management statutes, the ambiguous or open-ended 
language of the statutory provisions in question, and a reluctance to second-guess the 
scientific expertise of agency decision makers. 
The classic description of the multiple use, sustained yield mandate appears in 
Strickland v. Morton,183 in which the Ninth Circuit characterized the CMUA as a law 
that “breathe[s] discretion at every pore.”184  The rest of the court’s description is 
repeated less often, but it is no less revealing about the nature of the core statutory 
mandate.  The court construed the Act “to be a general grant of authority to the Secretary 
to administer the retention and disposal of those public lands under his domain as he felt 
would best comport with the national interest and the public welfare.”185  It found that 
the statute imposes “but few, and at that, the most generalized of limitations” on “the 
Secretary’s exercise of his discretion on the merits of a classification decision.”186  
Finally, it regarded “the statute’s admonition to the Secretary to ‘give due consideration 
to all pertinent factors’ in making his classification decision, [as] platitudinous at 
best.”187  The court found the statute to be so lacking in enforceable constraints that it 
held that the Interior Secretary’s decision to classify certain lands as suitable for 
retention in federal ownership, rather than to make them available for homestead entry 
was an action committed to agency discretion and therefore judicially unreviewable 
under the Administrative Procedure Act.188 
Even when judicial review of compliance with the multiple use or sustained yield 
mandates is available, it is usually highly deferential.  A federal district court in Alaska 
in a 1971 decision refused to enjoin timber harvesting in the Tongass National Forest at 
the behest of environmental groups.  It concluded that it was obliged to refrain from 
interfering with discretionary decisions the Forest Service makes under MUSYA and that 
it was appropriate to presume that the agency gave due consideration to all of the values 
specified in the statute.189  Similarly, in a decision rendered the year before Congress 
 
 182. Michael Blumm argues that “multiple use is founded upon a standardless delegation of authority to 
managers of public lands and waters. . . .”  Blumm, supra n.70, at 407.  As a result, he adds, FLPMA and the 
NFMA are examples of “the archetypal ‘special interest’ legislation” that has led to frequent capitulation of the 
Forest Service and the BLM to pressure from local commodity interest groups, such as ranchers, timber 
companies, and electric utilities.  Id. 
  The courts have found sustained yield provisions in other environmental statutes to be no more helpful 
in defining the parameters of agency discretion than the provisions of MUSYA, FLPMA, and the NFMA.  See 
e.g. Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (concluding that the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2006), “sets as a goal ‘to obtain an optimum sustainable population keeping 
in mind the optimum carrying capacity of the habitat,’” but that “the definitions of both [optimum sustainable 
population] and optimum carrying capacity are singularly unenlightening; each is defined in terms of the 
other.”). 
 183. 519 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 184. Id. at 469. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 469–70. 
 188. Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d at 467–72.  The Administrative Procedure Act provides that its judicial 
review provisions, including the availability of judicial review in federal courts, apply, but not when “agency 
action is committed to agency discretion by law.”  5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2006).  See also id. at §§ 702, 704 
(giving aggrieved parties a right to review, and stating that final agency action is subject to judicial review). 
 189. Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 123–24 (D. Alaska 1971).  See also Dorothy Thomas Found., 
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adopted the NFMA, the Fourth Circuit characterized the provisions of MUSYA as 
“broad and ambiguous” and, as a result, lacking any bearing on the legality of proposed 
timber sales.190 
In Perkins v. Bergland, a leading case construing MUSYA’s multiple use, 
sustained yield provisions, the Ninth Circuit addressed the claims of two brothers that the 
Forest Service had improperly reduced their grazing permits.191  They argued that 
MUSYA supplied sufficient standards to allow judicial review of what the court called 
“the highly technical assessment of the proper carrying capacity of grazing land.”192  
The court responded that MUSYA is composed of “the most general clauses and 
phrases” that “can hardly be considered concrete limits upon agency discretion.  Rather, 
it is language which ‘breathe[s] discretion at every pore.’”193  The court refused to upset 
the agency’s determination because doing so would require the court to “choos[e] one 
theory of range management as superior to another.”194  Judicial review was available 
only to determine whether the Forest Service’s factual findings were arbitrary and 
capricious and whether its decision to reduce grazing allotments was irrational.195  The 
courts subsequently have applied Perkins’ characterization of the nature and limitations 
of judicial review to the multiple use, sustained yield provisions of both the NFMA196 
and FLPMA.197 
Some courts have even written the sustained yield component of the multiple use 
statutes out of existence.  In Wyoming v. United States Department of Agriculture,198 for 
example, a federal district court in Wyoming struck down the Clinton Administration’s 
roadless area management rule199 because it violated the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) and the Wilderness Act.  In doing so, the court stated that “[t]he Wilderness 
Act provides protection for a use of the National Forests that was not contemplated by 
either the Organic Act or the MUSYA—preservation of the National Forests for use and 
enjoyment of present and future generations.”200  While it is true that neither the 1897 
 
Inc. v. Hardin, 317 F. Supp. 1072, 1074–75 (W.D.N.C. 1970) (rejecting attack on Forest Service’s timber 
management under MUSYA). 
 190. W. Va. Div. of Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 954 (4th Cir. 1975).  Cf. U.S. v. N.M, 
438 U.S. 696 (1978) (recognizing that MUSYA broadens the purposes for which the national forests must be 
administered but holding that it did not expand the United States’ implied reserved water rights). 
 191. 608 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 192. Id. at 806. 
 193. Id. at 806 (quoting Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d at 469). 
 194. Id. at 807. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See e.g. Clinch Coalition v. Damon, 316 F. Supp. 2d 364, 378 (W.D. Va. 2004); Big Hole Ranchers 
Assn., Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 686 F. Supp. 256, 263 (D. Mont. 1988) (noting the breadth of discretion vested 
in the Forest Service by MUSYA and the NFMA). 
 197. See e.g. Utah v. Norton,  2006 WL 2711798 at *21 (D. Utah Sept. 20, 2006) (“These principles allow 
the BLM broad discretion in its treatment of public lands.”), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Utah v. U.S. 
Dept. of the Int., 535 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 198. 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Wyo. 2003). 
 199. Department of Agriculture, National Forest Service, Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 
Fed. Reg. 3244.  For discussion of the rule and its Bush Administration successor, see Glicksman, supra n. 173. 
 200. Wyoming v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 277 F. Supp. at 1234.  The Wilderness Act provides: 
In order to assure that an increasing population, accompanied by expanding settlement and growing 
mechanization, does not occupy and modify all areas within the United States and its possessions, 
leaving no lands designated for preservation and protection in their natural condition, it is hereby 
declared to be the policy of the Congress to secure for the American people of present and future 
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Organic Act nor MUSYA refers to use of the national forests by future generations, 
MUSYA’s provisions recognize the Forest Service’s obligation to manage the forests for 
the long term, without impairing the productivity of the forests.201  In addition, the 
NFMA, which was the statutory underpinning for the roadless rule, declares that the 
National Forest System is “dedicated to the long-term benefit for present and future 
generations.”202 
The courts have on occasion recognized that the sustained yield provisions have 
substantive content beyond a barely reviewable mandate to consider the listed statutory 
factors.  The Supreme Court in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, for 
example, characterized FLPMA’s sustained yield “management goal” to “require[ ] 
BLM to control depleting uses over time, so as to ensure a high level of valuable uses in 
the future.”203  The actual holding of the case, however, was that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to compel the BLM to restrict off-road vehicle use that allegedly threatened 
degradation of wilderness study areas because the plaintiff environmental group failed to 
identify a discrete action that the BLM was required but failed to take.  The Third Circuit 
remarked in 2005 that “Forest Plans must provide this multiple-use and sustained yield 
of goods and services from the Allegheny National Forest in a way that maximizes long-
term net public benefits in an environmentally sound manner.”204  Despite its 
recognition of this obligation, the court refused to block the agency’s decision to allow 
clearcutting, in part because the NFMA mandates consideration of economic as well as 
environmental factors.205  A federal district court, in addressing the charge that the 
Forest Service was managing the national forests in Texas in violation of the NFMA, 
stated: 
The National Forests are managed for obtaining a sustained yield of various resources, and 
 
generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness. 
16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).  Many other federal environmental and natural resource management statutes explicitly 
seek to protect the interests of future generations.  See e.g. id. at. § 1 (stating that “the fundamental purpose of 
the said parks, monuments, and reservations . . . is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects 
and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same . . . unimpaired for the enjoyment of 
future generations.”); id. at § 470(b)(4) (stating that one of the purposes of the National Historic Preservation 
Act was to preserve a nation’s “irreplaceable heritage . . . so that its vital legacy of cultural, educational, 
aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and energy benefits will be maintained and enriched for future 
generations”); id. at § 1271 (declaring it to be “the policy of the United States that certain selected rivers of the 
Nation which, with their immediate environments, possess outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, 
geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values, shall be preserved in free-flowing 
condition, and that they and their immediate environments shall be protected for the benefit and enjoyment of 
present and future generations”); 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2006) (“declares that it is the continuing policy of the 
Federal Government . . . to use all practicable means and measures . . . in a manner calculated to foster and 
promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in 
productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations 
of Americans”).  These statutes do not necessarily create mechanisms to protect the interests of future 
generations if the agencies do not do so.  See e.g. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Natl. Park Serv., 387 F. Supp. 
2d 1178, 1189–90 (D. Utah 2005) (finding that the NPS Organic Act “does not define the word ‘unimpaired’ or 
the phrase ‘unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.’  Thus, while the Act clearly directs the NPS to 
regulate parks pursuant to broad objectives, the agency is left with the task of further defining and applying this 
standard.”). 
 201. See supra nn. 89–90 and accompanying text. 
 202. 16 U.S.C. § 1609(a). 
 203. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 58 (2004) (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1702(h) (2000), 
which defines sustained yield). 
 204. Allegheny Def. Project, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 423 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 205. Id. at 231–32. 
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of course the mix of forest resources changes, requiring at times trading one resource for 
another in a particular area of the forest.  In making these trade-offs, however, the Forest 
Service cannot substantially and permanently damage the productivity of the forest 
land. . . . 
 The Forest Service has a difficult task managing the forest lands in a way that sustains a 
yield of all key forest resources.  Compliance with the NFMA and regulations is not easy, but 
it is necessary to ensure a sustained yield of forest resources in perpetuity for the public 
good.206 
But the Fifth Circuit vacated that decision because the suit represented an illegitimate 
programmatic challenge rather than an effort to reverse any identifiable final agency 
action.207 
The cases discussed above do little to preclude the BLM and the Forest Service 
from “deep fry[ing] the goose that laid the golden egg” in their management of federal 
lands and resources.208  Neither statute’s sustained yield provisions clearly mandate that 
the multiple use agencies preserve the ecological integrity of the federal lands in a 
manner that is consistent with intergenerational equity, the agencies have not always 
done so, and the courts are disinclined to intervene when they do not.  Part IV provides 
suggestions for strengthening the sustained yield provisions of FLPMA and the NFMA 
so that they impose on the land management agencies a duty to preserve ecological 
integrity that is enforceable by representatives of future generations. 
IV. A NATURAL RESOURCE TRUST MODEL FOR PROTECTING ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY 
Congress has recognized in the federal land management statutes that federal lands 
and resources ought to benefit future as well as present generations.  The multiple use, 
sustained yield statutes that govern management of the bulk of the federal estate, 
however, fall short of ensuring intergenerational equity through protection of an 
unimpaired flow of ecosystem services, a concept which is at the core of the international 
law principle of sustainable resource use.  One of the problems presented by MUSYA, 
FLPMA, and the NFMA is that they define sustained yield in a way that appears to 
emphasize commodity production instead of protection of ecological integrity.  A second 
problem is that the dictate to manage in accordance with multiple use, sustained yield 
principles209 is too vague, and affords the agencies too much discretion, to make the 
agencies accountable for management decisions that impair ecological integrity.  In 
particular, the sustained yield mandate fails to provide federal land users a sufficient 
opportunity to enforce the agencies’ responsibility to avoid “deep frying the goose” if 
they manage the federal lands in ways that disrupt the capacity of those lands to continue 
 
 206. Sierra Club v. Glickman, 974 F. Supp. 905, 945–46 (E.D. Tex. 1997), aff’d sub nom. Sierra Club v. 
Peterson, 185 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 1999), vacated and remanded on reh’g en banc, 228 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2000).  
Cf. Mitchell v. U.S., 13 Cl. Ct. 474, 480 (1987) (construing one of the Indian land statutes, 25 U.S.C. § 466, to 
require “sustained yield management and hence an ongoing Governmental duty of forest regeneration”);  
Mitchell v. U.S., 10 Cl. Ct. 787, 789 (1986) (“The duty to replant, in other words, is an ever-present one, rather 
than one tied to a fixed point in time.”). 
 207. Sierra Club v. Peterson, 228 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 208. Conserv. L. Found. v. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing 141 Cong. Rec. H10232 (daily 
ed. Oct. 18, 1995)). 
 209. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a). 
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to provide an unimpaired flow of ecosystem services or otherwise benefit present users at 
the expense of the interests of future generations. 
This Part recommends that the multiple use statutes be amended to enhance 
intergenerational equity in federal land and resource management by requiring protection 
of the ecological integrity of the lands and resources administered by the Forest Service 
and the BLM.  Section A describes how the laws governing trusts and future interests 
may be helpful in creating enforceable duties on the part of the land management 
agencies to preserve ecological integrity. Section B analyzes how the agencies’ trust 
obligations may be enforced by challenging particular land management decisions that 
deviate from those obligations. Section C urges the enactment of substantive standards to 
flesh out the duties of the trustees, and provides examples of the kinds of standards that 
may be well suited to achieving the protection of long-term ecological integrity, without 
sacrificing the interests of the present generation.  The argument here relies on several 
contexts in which trusts have been used, or in which scholars have argued they should be 
used, to preserve trust capital (such as natural resources) for future use.  In doing so, it 
extends the notion of a natural resource trust in which the trustees are bound to protect 
ecological integrity into a context in which the trust construct has not yet been used. 
Even a new, general mandate to protect ecological integrity or prevent waste of the 
trust corpus is unlikely to achieve the intergenerational equity goals promoted here, 
however.  One of the principal problems of the FLPMA and NFMA provisions that 
aspire to achieving sustainable land and resource use is the absence of detailed directives 
by which the agencies may be held accountable.  Section C therefore urges the enactment 
of substantive standards to flesh out the duties of the trustees, and provides examples of 
the kinds of standards that may be well suited to achieving the protection of long-term 
ecological integrity, without sacrificing the interests of the present generation.  These 
context-specific standards would be rooted in current scientific understanding of the 
manner in which ecosystem components interrelate.  They would allow agencies to 
pursue short-term gain (through resource extraction, for example), but not at the cost of 
long-term sustainability.  The combination of more specific, science-based standards and 
the creation of fiduciary obligations for the multiple use agencies should make judicial 
review a more meaningful mechanism for holding the Forest Service and the BLM 
accountable if they deviate from the revised statutory mandate to pursue sustainable 
resource use. 
A. Intergenerational Equity, Natural Resource Trusts, and the Protection of 
Environmental Principal under Existing Law 
The achievement of sustainable resource development is an important way to 
promote intergenerational equity by preventing the present generation from making 
resource use choices at the expense of the interests of future generations.210  The 
discussion above indicates that the multiple use, sustained yield statutes that govern 
decision making by the Forest Service and the BLM are not up to the task of preserving 
the flow of environmental services provided by the federal lands so that these services 
 
 210. See e.g. Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common 
Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity 226 (UN U. & Transnational Publishers Inc. 1989). 
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will be available in uncompromised form for future generations.  This section explores 
whether doctrines that are designed to protect the interests of those who come later under 
both domestic law and international environmental law—primarily the law of trusts—
provide models for improving the regime that governs management of the multiple use 
federal lands so that ecological integrity is more likely to be protected and 
intergenerational equity is more likely to be achieved. 
1. The Common Law Methods for Protecting Future Interest Holders 
The Anglo-American property law system allows private ownership of assets to be 
split between those entitled to use those assets now (the holders of present possessory 
estates) and those entitled to use them in the future (the holders of future interests).211  
One problem with splitting private ownership between those entitled to use the assets 
now and those entitled to use them later is that their interests may not coincide.  Because 
present possessory estate holders control use decisions, the threat of improper 
infringement on the ownership rights of others typically involves current use that results 
in a decline in the value of future interests.  The present possessory estate holders, for 
example, may prefer to cut down all the trees and sell the harvested timber or to extract 
all the oil and gas beneath the surface of the property to maximize the value of these 
assets during their right to present possession.  The future interest holders may prefer that 
some of these resources be left in place so that they may benefit from them after the 
termination of the present possessory estate, even if that means a decline in the value of 
the land for the present possessors.  Some mechanism is needed to accommodate the 
potentially conflicting interests of present possessors and the holders of future interests. 
One common law solution that is designed to “keep[] in balance the conflicting 
desires of persons having interests in the same land” is the cause of action in waste.212  
The waste action is designed to enable future interest holders to protect their interests by 
halting actions by present possessors that would improperly harm future interests or by 
compensating future interest holders for harm that has already occurred.213  The first 
Restatement of Property defined “[t]he duty not to commit waste [as] a duty, the extent 
of which is correlative to the degree of protection to which the owner of the future 
interest is entitled as against uses made by, or conduct of, the owner of the possessory 
estate.”214  The nature of the duty varies with the circumstances, and in particular, with 
the nature of the present possessory estates and future interests at issue.215  The holder of 
 
 211. Joseph William Singer, Introduction to Property 304–06 (2d ed., Aspen 2005). 
 212. Powell on Real Property 679 (Richard R. Powell & Patrick H. Rohans eds., 1968) (stating that “waste 
is, functionally, a part of the law which keeps in balance the conflicting desires of persons having interests in 
the same land”) [hereinafter Powell].  Powell further defines waste as conduct (either by way of commission or 
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a life estate, for example, has “a duty not to act upon the land in which his estate for life 
exists so that his conduct causes the market value of the interests limited after his estate 
for life to be diminished.”216  Most generally, the waste doctrine “restrains the present 
estate owner from acting in a manner that unreasonably injures the affected land and thus 
reduces the value of the future interest.”217  If the land whose ownership is split among 
present possessors and future interest holders contains valuable nonrenewable resources, 
the duty not to commit waste restricts the authority of present possessory estate holders 
to extract and remove minerals.218  If the property contains renewable resources such as 
trees, life estate holders may not diminish the market value of the accompanying future 
interest by cutting trees or other permanent growths.219 
Over time, the common law system of estates and future interest that originated in 
England was modified by the development of trusts.220  The recognition of trusts, the 
descendant of the use legalized by the Statute of Uses,221 allows for more flexible 
management of property with split ownership.  The trust mechanism separates legal and 
equitable ownership.  It vests legal title to trust property in a trustee, who has enforceable 
fiduciary duties to manage the property for the benefit of the beneficiaries.  These duties 
include an obligation to protect and avoid wasting trust assets, a duty to restore them 
when damaged, and a duty of loyalty to trust beneficiaries.222  The trust beneficiaries 
hold equitable title.  Just as under the traditional system of estates, equitable title may be 
split among those with the right to use and possess the property now and those with the 
right to do so in the future, when the equitable present possessory estate ends.223  These 
beneficiaries may seek judicial oversight of the trustee’s administration of the trust.  If 
mismanagement or breach of fiduciary duty is shown, the courts may force the trustee to 
alter current management methods or to account to the beneficiaries for the results of 
past mismanagement.224  Typically, any one of the beneficiaries may bring suit alleging 
breach of fiduciary duty (such as a failure to protect trust assets against waste)225 or for 
an accounting.226 
2. The Public Trust Doctrine 
Although the trust concept was initially developed primarily to facilitate 
 
protection at law becomes less and the need for resort to equity becomes greater.”). 
 216. Restatement, supra n. 214, at § 138. 
 217. John G. Sprankling, Understanding Property Law 124 (2d ed., LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2007).  
This result flows from the law’s presumption “that the original grantor intended the estate holder to pass on 
possession of the land to the future interest holder in approximately the same condition it was received.”  Id. 
 218. Restatement, supra n. 214, at § 138 cmt. d. 
 219. Id. at § 138 cmt. f. 
 220. See Jesse Dukeminier et al., Property 239–40 (6th ed., Aspen 2006). 
 221. Charles Donahue Jr., Thomas E. Kauper & Peter W. Martin, Property: An Introduction to the Concept 
and the Institution 445 (3d ed., West 1993). 
 222. See Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the 
Environment for Present and Future Generations 43–49 (white paper written in conjunction with the Climate 
Legacy Initiative) (May 2008) (available at http://www.law.uoregon.edu/faculty/mwood/docs/cli.pdf). 
 223. Dukeminier et al., supra n. 220, at 239. 
 224. See Singer, supra n. 211, at 318. 
 225. See Wood, supra n. 222, at 44 (“A trustee that fails to protect the property against ‘waste’ is liable to 
the beneficiaries.”). 
 226. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and Society 1074 (3d ed., 
Aspen 2004).  See also Wood, supra n. 222, at 50–51. 
2008] SUSTAINABLE FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT 181 
management of private assets, the courts also have applied trust concepts in this country 
to public resources under the rubric of the public trust doctrine.227  Further, the same 
fiduciary obligations applicable to the trustees of private trusts also appear to apply to 
public trustees.228  Nonetheless, the public trust doctrine discussed in this section is not a 
sufficient substitute for new legislation imposing a trust framework on the multiple use 
agencies because the courts have applied the doctrine primarily in cases involving the 
use of state-owned lands and because its scope even in those cases tends to be limited. 
The case typically regarded as the first to develop and apply the public trust 
doctrine in the United States229 was the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois Central 
Railroad Company v. Illinois,230 in which the Court declared that a public trust 
precluded the Illinois legislature from selling Chicago’s harbor because it was important 
to commerce, navigation, and fishing.  The status and scope of the public trust doctrine 
differ significantly from state to state in accordance with state constitutional provisions, 
statutes, and judicial decisions.231  The common core premise of the doctrine in those 
states that recognize it is that “some natural resources are so important to the public’s 
well being that they should not be destroyed by the present generation, but should instead 
be retained in ‘trust’ by the sovereign for the continued welfare of future generations.”232 
Courts have applied the public trust doctrine to prevent potentially damaging 
uses,233 to force state legislatures or agencies to take actions to protect trust resources,234 
and even to require private interests that damage trust assets to compensate the state.235  
Further, courts have recognized that the beneficiaries of the public trust include both 
present and future generations.236  Indeed, some scholars have construed the common 
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law public trust doctrine to reflect a presumption that the government is obliged to 
preserve the natural and cultural legacy received from past generations for trust 
beneficiaries, the present and future generations.237  Under at least one formulation of 
the doctrine, “[t]he basic fiduciary duty is to maintain the asset’s ability to provide a 
steady abundance of environmental services for future generations.”238 
Although the public trust doctrine plays an important role in management of state-
owned lands and resources,239 its application has been limited.  The doctrine typically 
covers only water and wildlife resources.240  Given biologists’ increasing recognition of 
“the complex interdependencies among the various resources, biogeochemical processes, 
and stressors that comprise ecosystems,”241 this limitation seems to collide with physical 
realities.  Trust responsibilities should adhere to entire ecosystems, not just to artificially 
segmented components of them. 
In addition, the public trust doctrine as this section has described it is confined 
primarily to state-owned resources.242  Efforts to extend it to federal lands and resources 
have not succeeded and, in particular, “it has never been infused into the statutory and 
regulatory structure that now dominates the field of natural resources law” at the federal 
level.243  The Supreme Court referred to ownership of public lands in trust for the 
American people nearly a century ago.244  But in this and several other cases, the resort 
to trust language took the form of dicta or occurred in contexts that may limit the 
doctrine to narrowly prescribed circumstances.  None of these cases involved the 
question of whether the trust doctrine operates as a constraint on federal power, as 
opposed to a source of governmental authority.245  As a result, as Professor Pearson has 
explained, the public trust doctrine “exists only nominally in federal law. . . .  [I]n federal 
law, the doctrine effectively is a non-player,” so that the government can manage federal 
lands and resources “free and clear” of any common law-derived public trust duties.246 
3. Statutory Federal Natural Resource Trusts 
Despite the virtual absence of judge-made federal public trust law, federal natural 
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resource management is not completely devoid of trust relationships.  The courts have 
not interpreted FLPMA and the NFMA as imposing trust-derived fiduciary duties on the 
multiple use agencies in their management of federal lands and resources.  The use of 
trust doctrine in other federal land and resource contexts nevertheless may provide 
Congress with useful precedents in creating trust responsibilities for the BLM and the 
Forest Service. 
A few lower court cases invoke trust language that is arguably derivative of 
statutory duties.  A federal district court in California recognized the National Park 
Service’s trust obligation in managing timber resources in Redwood National Park.247  
Subsequent decisions have not relied on that case to impose affirmative duties that bind 
the agency in its management of that or other parks.  Some courts have explicitly refused 
to recognize that the Park Service has any extra-statutory duties.248 
The statutes and regulations governing ownership and management of Indian lands 
also create trust relationships between the United States and the tribes.  The Supreme 
Court has recognized that these statutes and regulations 
clearly give the Federal Government full responsibility to manage Indian resources and 
land for the benefit of the Indians.  They thereby establish a fiduciary relationship . . . .  
Moreover, a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the Government assumes such 
elaborate control over forests and property belonging to Indians.  All of the necessary 
elements of a common-law trust are present: a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the 
Indian allottees), and a trust corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds).  “[W]here the Federal 
Government takes on or has control or supervision over tribal monies or properties, the 
fiduciary relationship normally exists with respect to such monies or properties (unless 
Congress has provided otherwise) even though nothing is said expressly in the authorizing 
or underlying statute (or other fundamental document) about a trust fund, or a trust or 
fiduciary connection.” 249 
The Court also has concluded that the federal government is liable in damages for 
the breach of its fiduciary duties because the right of an injured beneficiary to sue the 
trustee for damages resulting from a breach of the trust is a fundamental incident of a 
trust relationship, and liability for breach of fiduciary duties acts as a deterrent to the 
federal government’s breach of its trust responsibilities to the tribes.250  The 
government’s fiduciary responsibilities to the tribes include a duty to use reasonable care 
and skill in preserving trust property and to prevent waste of trust resources.251  These 
responsibilities apply only to lands held by the federal government for the tribes, not to 
the multiple use lands managed by the Forest Service and the BLM. 
Several federal pollution control statutes create explicit trust relationships.  The 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA)252 requires the President to designate federal officials to “act on behalf of the 
public as trustees for natural resources” injured or destroyed by a release of hazardous 
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substances.253  The trustees are authorized to assess damages for injured natural 
resources over which they have management responsibility and, in conjunction with the 
Department of Justice, to seek recovery of those damages from parties responsible for 
the release.254  Natural resource trustees also may issue administrative cleanup orders.255  
EPA regulations designate the Interior Department (including the BLM) as trustee for 
lands managed by that agency and the Department of Agriculture (including the Forest 
Service) as trustee for the national forests.256  Trust authority and responsibility under 
CERCLA only extends to lands and resources adversely affected by a release of 
hazardous substances.  The Oil Pollution Act creates similar trust relationships for 
natural resources injured, lost, or destroyed by oil spills, with similar jurisdictional 
limitations.257 
It is possible to construe the statutes that currently govern Forest Service and BLM 
management decisions to impose trust duties on the two agencies.  The NFMA defines 
the National Forest System as a series of units “united into a nationally significant 
system dedicated to the long-term benefit for present and future generations.”258  One 
way to interpret that provision is to construe it as placing the lands that compose the 
National Forest System into a trust that is dedicated to the benefit of present and future 
generations of Americans.  The substantive provisions of the NFMA providing 
management directives to the Forest Service make that agency the trustee.  But there is 
no judicial support for this interpretation of the NFMA.  The courts have cited the 
relevant provision in only three cases and have never relied on it in resolving any 
substantive issue.259 
It is harder to derive a trust relationship from the provisions of FLPMA.  The 
statute defines “‘multiple use’” as “the management of the public lands and their various 
resource values so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present 
and future needs of the American people; . . .  a combination of balanced and diverse 
resource uses that takes into account the long-term needs of future generations for 
renewable and nonrenewable resources . . . .”260  This provision arguably creates a trust 
over the public lands within the BLM’s jurisdiction.  The BLM is the trustee responsible 
for managing those lands for the identified trust beneficiaries.  But the provision is only a 
definitional one and lacks the language of creation and obligation that would likely have 
appeared if Congress had intended to create a trust. 
One final candidate for the creation of trust duties that cover the federal lands, 
including the multiple use lands, is NEPA.  NEPA declares the federal government’s 
policy “to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in 
productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present 
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and future generations of Americans.”261  The Act also establishes 
[a] continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, 
consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate 
Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may—(1) 
fulfill the responsibilities . . . as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations; . . . 
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and 
maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of 
individual choice; . . . and (6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the 
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.262 
That provision arguably creates duties such as those imposed on trustees, explicitly 
identifies the federal government as a trustee of the environment, and designates 
succeeding generations as the trust beneficiaries.  Finally, NEPA “directs that, to the 
fullest extent possible, . . . the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States 
shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in” 
NEPA.263  Putting the statutory caveat (“to the fullest extent possible”) aside, NEPA 
appears to require federal agencies to implement their organic statutes in a manner 
consistent with NEPA policies, including the protection of the interests of future 
generations.  Under this reading, the Forest Service and the BLM are obliged to 
administer the multiple use, sustained yield provisions of their organic statutes in a 
manner that fulfills the trust responsibilities created in NEPA.  Given the Supreme 
Court’s continuing refusal to recognize any substantive duties in NEPA’s provisions,264 
however, it is almost inconceivable that the Court would endorse an interpretation of 
NEPA that makes it an overlay statute that affects the substantive responsibilities of all 
federal agencies. 
4. Sustainable Development, the Intergenerational Trust, and International 
Environmental Law 
One further body of environmental law provides a basis for the creation of natural 
resource trusts whose function is to preserve ecological integrity and protect 
intergenerational equity.  This section discusses the role of natural resource trusts in 
international law, particularly the international treaties and conventions bearing on 
sustainable development.  It concludes that although international environmental law 
may create natural resource trusts under which national governments are obliged to 
preserve ecological integrity, both the existence and scope of such trusts are disputed.  
The international law version of sustainability is therefore insufficient to impose on the 
United States and the federal land management agencies a trust obligation to preserve 
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ecological integrity and protect intergenerational equity. 
The conception of the earth and its natural resources as the res of a trust goes back 
decades.  In the early 1970s, economist E.F. Schumacher criticized society’s “failure to 
distinguish between income and capital where this distinction  matters most . . . : namely, 
the irreplaceable capital which man has not made, but simply found, and without which 
he can do nothing.”265  Schumacher supported efforts to minimize the current rate of use 
of natural resources and urged that income derived from the use of non-renewable 
resources such as oil and gas “be placed into a special fund to be devoted exclusively to 
the evolution of production methods and patterns of living which do not depend on fossil 
fuels at all or depend on them only to a very slight extent,” so that future generations 
may thrive even when those resources run out.266 
The application of trust principles to the goal of sustainable natural resource use 
was fleshed out more fully in Edith Brown Weiss’s 1989 book, In Fairness to Future 
Generations.267  Professor Weiss regarded each generation as the recipient of “a natural 
and cultural legacy in trust from previous generations [which it] holds [ ] in trust for 
future generations.”268  She argued that this trust relationship imposes on each 
generation 
certain planetary obligations to conserve the natural and cultural resource base for future 
generations and also gives each generation certain planetary rights as beneficiaries of the 
trust to benefit from the legacy of their ancestors.  These planetary obligations and 
planetary rights form the corpus of a proposed doctrine of intergenerational equity, or 
justice between generations.269 
The problem of intergenerational equity arises because the interests of future 
generations tend to be ignored when resource use decisions, and the trade-offs they 
involve, are made.  If the present generation depletes a non-renewable resource such as 
oil, future generations will not be able to enjoy the benefits currently derived from that 
resource.270  Even if the present generation does not use up a resource entirely, its price 
rises as it becomes scarcer.  Future generations may be able to develop substitutes for 
scarce or depleted resources, but the price of developing them may be much higher than 
the price of the original resource would have been had it not been depleted.271 
Accordingly, Professor Weiss argues that the current generation should be subject 
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to a duty, or a series of duties, to engage in sustainable natural resource use: 
For renewable resources such as fauna, flora, soils and water, the essence of the planetary 
duty is to develop and use them on a sustainable basis.  For endangered species of fauna 
and flora, this may lead to stringent methods of protection, as by prohibiting trade in them.  
For certain unique natural resources, it may mean preservation of them in their present 
form.  But for most renewable resources, it means that they can be developed and used for 
the benefit of present generations in any manner consistent with their renewal and hence 
availability for future generations.272 
The duties could be translated into fairly specific mandates.  Sustainable development of 
renewable resources such as water, for example, “requires that they not be exploited in 
excess of recharge rates.”273 
Professor Weiss relied on analogies to domestic property and trust law to explain 
the nature of the planetary trust and the rights and obligations it created.  She noted, for 
example, that among the “[m]any useful analogies in domestic legal systems” is the 
principle that although beneficiaries of a common law charitable trust may enjoy the 
benefits of the trust, they are obliged not to dissipate its corpus for future 
beneficiaries.274  She found the concept of equality among generations to be consistent 
with “the underlying premises of tenancy, stewardship and trusteeship: the assets must be 
conserved, not dissipated, by those responsible for them so that those coming after 
receive equal assets.”275  Professor Weiss developed a series of principles of 
intergenerational equity that could implement the Brundtland Commission’s plea for 
sustainable development.  The principles were “intended to ensure equitable access to 
our planetary natural and cultural environment and at the same time to recognize limits 
on how we use our environment so we can pass it to future generations in as good 
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legal owner of the trust property, the trustee has management powers over the trust property, but 
subject to the duty, enforceable under the equitable jurisdiction of the courts, to exercise those 
powers for the exclusive benefit of the beneficiary who is the beneficial or equitable owner of the 
trust property. 
Redgwell, supra, n. 273, at 8. 
 275. Weiss, supra n. 210, at 24–25. 
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condition as we received it.”276 
Professor Weiss’s conceptualization of sustainable development as a kind of 
codification of an intergenerational trust mechanism provides a starting point for 
protecting intergenerational equity.  But “[t]he challenge for policy-makers is to design 
institutional arrangements that can harness the insights of trust doctrine into practical 
standards for the conservation of environmental resources.”277  In practice, the 
codification of sustainable development principles in international environmental treaties 
and other documents has not yet coalesced into the kind of planetary trust envisioned by 
Professor Weis. 
The interpretation of sustainable development as the source of a trust obligation 
that benefits future generations has been controversial in the development of 
international environmental law.  The existence, nature, and scope of the duties incurred 
by the present generation have all been subject to debate.  During the negotiations that 
culminated in 1972 in the Stockholm Declaration,278 which “helped to lay the 
groundwork for the subsequent acceptance of the concept of sustainable 
development,”279 the U.N. Secretary General urged that the international community 
endorse the existence of an intergenerational trust relationship.  The trust would 
recognize a “duty of all nations to carefully husband their natural resources and to hold 
in trust for present and future generations the air, water, lands and communities of plants 
and animals on which life depends.”280  Developing nations objected to any references to 
obligations, duties, or trusts because that language implied constraints on their 
development objectives that would infringe upon national sovereignty.281  The 
opponents of the explicit recognition of a trust prevailed, so that the final version of 
Principle 2 of the Stockholm Declaration states weakly, in the passive voice, that “[t]he 
natural resources of the earth . . . must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and 
future generations through careful planning or management, as appropriate.”282 
More than twenty years later, the United Nations Commission on Sustainable 
Development argued that the principle of intergenerational equity, referred to in 
documents such as Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration, reflects the existence of a trust in 
which the present generation is entitled to use the fruits of the Earth for their own 
benefit, while simultaneously being subject to a duty to preserve it for the benefit of 
 
 276. Id. at 39.  The principles included conservation of options, conservation of quality, and conservation of 
access.  Id. at 38.  The first of the three options “shifts the burden of justification to those who would destroy 
these resources or exploit them on a basis that cannot be sustained.”  Id. at 225. 
 277. Richardson, supra n. 273, at 310–11.  See also Tarlock, supra n. 49, at 48 (“Enormous problems remain 
in working out what the precise duties stemming from [the fundamental international environmental ethic of 
the duty to conserve resources for future generations] are, but the core principle that we must restrain present 
consumption for the benefit of future generations is a powerful idea that runs counter to the longstanding 
Western belief in progress.”). 
 278. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972), 11 I.L.M. 
1416 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. 
 279. David Hunter, James Salzman & Durwood Zaelke, International Environmental Law and Policy 171 
(3d ed., Found. Press 2007). 
 280. G.F. Maggio, Inter/Intragenerational Equity: Current Applications under International Law for 
Promoting the Sustainable Development of Natural Resources, 4 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 161, 203 (1997). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Stockholm Declaration, supra n. 278, at Principle 2.  See Maggio, supra n. 280, at 203. 
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future generations.283  That interpretation is subject to dispute, however. 
According to one expert, “[n]one of the extant international conventions dealing 
with conservation and sustainable development of natural resources have used the term 
‘trust’ when referring to issues of ‘inter-’ or ‘intra-’ generational equity.  Instead they 
have consistently employed the term ‘for the benefit of’ or similar language.”284 
Even if the international law commitment to achieving sustainable development 
creates a trust, the nature of the fiduciary duties it creates are unclear.  In particular, two 
competing versions of sustainability—weak and strong—create confusion about the 
nature of any natural resource trust duties recognized by international environmental law.  
According to Professor Kysar, for example, proponents of the weak versions of 
sustainability take the position that any “attempt to preserve a particular portfolio of 
natural capital assets for future generations poses an insurmountable empirical challenge 
that is destined to cause wasteful or paternalistic resource decision making.285 
Under the strong version of sustainability, natural resource use is limited to 
“ecologically determined conditions of sustainability,” such as exploitation of renewable 
resources “at a rate that can be repeated indefinitely, and depletion of nonrenewable 
resources at a rate equal to the rate of development of substitute resources.”286  They 
conceive of intergenerational equity as the source of “a duty not only to maintain the 
stock of useful capital in the aggregate, but also to ensure the integrity of vital ecological 
processes and the availability of particular kinds and amounts of natural resources.”287 
5. The Inadequacy of Existing Law 
The concept of a trust provides a theoretical framework around which to build a 
legal structure whose goal is achieving sustainable resource development and an 
equitable accommodation of the interests of present and future generations in the 
capacity to use and benefit from natural resources.  Current laws, both domestic and 
international, provide the seeds for the creation of trust obligations that bind the Forest 
Service and the BLM to the protection of ecological integrity for the benefit of present 
and future generations.  None of the bodies of law discussed in this section creates firm 
trust responsibilities of this sort, however.  Trust doctrine nevertheless can be a valuable 
framework for enhancing the capability of the laws governing the lands and resources 
managed by the Forest Service and the BLM to achieve sustainability.  The next section 
argues that a statutory trust mechanism applicable to the multiple use lands holds 
promise as a means of achieving sustainability in federal land management. 
 
 283. Edith Brown Weiss, A Reply to Barresi’s “Beyond Fairness to Future Generations”, 11 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 
89, 96 (1997). 
 284. Maggio, supra n. 280, at 203–04. 
 285. Kysar, supra n. 8, at 2123.  The advocates of weak sustainability do recognize the present generation’s 
duty to “support a nondeclining stream of utility” by assuring that “a portion of the proceeds from resource 
exhaustion actually was being reinvested in reproducible capital.”  Id.  See also supra n. 56. 
 286. Kysar, supra n. 8, at 2124–25 (emphasis omitted). 
 287. Id. at 2145.  Kysar adds: “By its nature, sustainable development assumes some responsibility on the 
part of present generations to collectively identify an ecological baseline beyond which human economic 
activity that impairs ecosystem functioning should stop.”  Id. 
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B. A New Federal Natural Resource Land Management Trust 
The trust doctrines described in section A provide precedents and potential models 
for the creation of trust relationships governing the multiple use lands, though none of 
those doctrines has yet been applied to those lands in comprehensive fashion, either by 
Congress or the courts.  This section relies on those models and concepts of natural 
resource trusteeship and intergenerational equity to argue that Congress should create 
trusts to govern management of the multiple use federal lands.  It describes the nature of 
the trusts, why trust concepts provide a more reliable mechanism for protecting 
ecosystem integrity than the current multiple use statutes do, and how the trusts may be 
enforced.  Section C provides examples of the specific management obligations that 
Congress might impose on the Forest Service and the BLM to achieve sustainable land 
and resource use, as this Article has conceptualized it. 
1. A Natural Resource Trust for Sustainability of the Multiple Use Lands 
The trust doctrines explored in section A above provide a model for protecting 
ecosystem integrity on the multiple use federal lands in a way it is not currently 
protected.288  Congress should amend the organic statutes of the Forest Service and the 
BLM by creating a trust to govern management of the multiple use lands, designating 
those two agencies as the trustees responsible for managing the resources entrusted to 
their care, designating present and future generations of the American people as the 
beneficiaries of the trust, and authorizing citizen suits to enforce the trust by 
representatives of trust beneficiaries if the Forest Service or the BLM is alleged to have 
violated trust duties, such as by engaging in or allowing waste of trust resources. 
The purpose of the sustainability trusts should be to prevent the Forest Service and 
the BLM from using or authorizing the use of the corpus, or “capital” of the trust, instead 
of just the “income” the trust res generates.  E.F. Schumacher concluded that, since 
World War II, “we have indeed been living on the capital of living nature . . . [in] 
alarming proportions.”289  In particular, he bemoaned our failure to recognize that we 
have been “using up a certain kind of irreplaceable capital asset, namely the tolerance 
margins which benign nature always provides.”290  According to Schumacher, the 
modern industrial system “lives on irreplaceable capital which it cheerfully treats as 
income.”291  Schumacher evocatively suggested, for example, that “a population basing 
its economic life on non-renewable fuels is living parasitically, on capital instead of 
income.”292  More recently, Professor Kysar has noted that, “[t]o most proponents of 
 
 288. Mary Wood has argued that “[w]hile ideally Congress would address the ecological crisis through a 
new set of trust-oriented statutes geared to solving the systemic problems, thus far Congress has passively 
abdicated responsibility.”  Wood, supra n. 222, at 52. 
 289. Schumacher, supra n. 265, at 18. 
 290. Id. at 19 (emphasis in original). 
 291. Id. at 21. 
 292. Id. at 64.  Schumacher added: 
Such a way of life could have no permanence and could therefore be justified only as a purely 
temporary expedient.  As the world’s resources of non-renewable fuels—coal, oil and natural gas—
are exceedingly unevenly distributed over the globe and undoubtedly limited in quantity, it is clear 
that their exploitation at an ever-increasing rate is an act of violence against nature which must 
almost inevitably lead to violence between men. 
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sustainable development, intergenerational equity in practice entails a duty not only to 
maintain the stock of useful capital in the aggregate, but also to ensure the integrity of 
vital ecological processes and the availability of particular kinds and amounts of natural 
resources.”293 
Any statutory or regulatory provisions explicating the duty to manage sustainably 
by protecting ecological integrity, such as those provided in section C below by way of 
example, would essentially elaborate on this prohibition on invading the capital of the 
multiple use lands trusts and provide judicially enforceable measures of sustainable and 
non-sustainable resource use.  Agency actions that invade resource “capital” should be 
deemed to amount to impermissible waste and therefore a breach of agency fiduciary 
duties.294  Preservation of natural resource capital would require maintenance of healthy 
ecosystems and of their ability to provide a continuing flow of ecosystem services for 
both present and future generations.295 
The multiple use statutes already require the Forest Service and the BLM to 
integrate biological and other scientific information into their decision making 
processes,296 give priority to areas of critical environmental concern,297 and exclude 
certain uses entirely from portions of the multiple use lands.298  FLPMA declares a 
policy favoring land management that protects the quality of ecological and 
environmental resource values and that, “where appropriate,” “preserve[s] and protect[s] 
certain public lands in their natural condition.”299  The NFMA requires that Forest 
Service planning guidelines insure consideration of the environmental aspects of 
renewable resource management300 and “provide for [the] diversity of plant and animal 
communities.”301  Each of these provisions has the potential to contribute to the 
protection of ecosystem integrity.  The difficulty with relying on these provisions to 
protect the “capital” of the multiple use lands is that they are all precatory,302 
conditional,303 constrained by the applicability of the insufficiently protective standards 
of the MUSY,304 or otherwise replete with discretionary authority that has been 
delegated to the agencies.  The NFMA’s diversity requirement, which is among both the 
more specific and environmentally protective provisions of the two statutes, is 
illustrative.  The Ninth Circuit recently emphasized the courts’ obligation to defer to the 
Forest Service’s judgment in applying that provision because it invokes the need for the 
agency’s high level of technical expertise.  Any other result, the court concluded, would 
 
Id. at 64–65. 
 293. Kysar, supra n. 8, at 2145. 
 294. Cf. Wood, supra n. 222, at 44 (arguing that a duty to protect natural resource assets under the public 
trust doctrine “is also a duty to prevent waste to those assets”). 
 295. See id. at 44–45.  See also id. at 59 (arguing that “[t]he driving factor in establishing a fiduciary 
standard is [protecting] the asset’s capacity to sustain and replenish itself”). 
 296. E.g. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(b); 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(2). 
 297. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(3). 
 298. Id. at § 1712(e)(1). 
 299. Id. at § 1701(a)(8). 
 300. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(A). 
 301. Id. at § 1604(g)(3)(B).. 
 302. E.g. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8). 
 303. E.g. id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (“to the degree practicable”). 
 304. E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B). 
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exceed the scope of judicial authority to review agency determinations under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard.305 
As Mary Wood has recognized, one major distinction between asset management 
under statutory delegations such as the ones under which the Forest Service and the 
BLM now operate and management pursuant to the fiduciary duties imposed by trusts is 
the degree of deference accorded the asset manager.  Under statutes such as FLPMA and 
the NFMA, judicial review historically has been highly deferential.306  In the trust 
context, the courts tend to engage in “aggressive judicial scrutiny.”307  The courts have 
recognized the need for such aggressive review in cases involving the government’s 
alleged breaches of the Indian land trusts.308 
2. Enforcement of Trust Obligations 
The imposition of statutory trust duties to manage federal ands and resources in a 
manner that avoids invasion of principal by preserving the capacity of federal lands and 
resources to continue supplying the full range of ecosystem services naturally available 
will not have its intended impact unless it is enforceable.309  The traditional methods of 
congressional and executive branch oversight would provide some constraints on any 
attempts by the agencies to deviate from their mandate to manage sustainably or from 
more specific statutory mandates such as those explored in section C below.310  So 
would provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act authorizing persons adversely 
affected by final agency actions to sue the agencies, and authorizing the courts to reverse 
arbitrary and capricious decisions.311  But for the reasons discussed in section B.1 of 
Part III above, arbitrary and capricious review historically has been a relatively blunt 
instrument in efforts by public land users to constrain agency management of lands 
 
 305. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 992 (9th Cir. 2008).  The court in McNair overruled its own 
NFMA diversity provision precedents (Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
127 S. Ct. 931 (2007); Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 1998)), in which it regarded 
judicial review as overly intrusive.  The McNair court characterized the Austin case as one in which it had 
“defied well-established law concerning the deference we owe to agencies and their methodological choices.”  
McNair, 537 F.3d at 991. 
 306. See Mary Christina Wood, Law and Climate Change: Government’s Atmospheric Trust Responsibility, 
38 Envtl. L. Rep. 10652, 10657 (Sept. 2008) (arguing that if a new natural resource management law is 
“pressed through the discretion frame, the government will continue to impoverish our natural resources until 
society can no longer sustain itself”). 
 307. Wood, supra n. 222, at 60.  Aggressive scrutiny is appropriate in circumstances in which a land 
management agency allegedly violates its duty of loyalty by serving private interests instead of the interests of 
the American people as a whole or its duty not to waste trust assets.  See id. at 24 (arguing that “[t]he core of 
the [public trust] doctrine requires trust management for public benefit rather than private exploit”); id. at 25 
(arguing that trustees may not allocate rights to destroy public trust assets); id. at 48 (“When a trustee official 
uses his or her office to favor industry friends to the detriment of the public trust, the duty of loyalty is 
breached.”). 
 308. See e.g. Seminole Nation v. U.S., 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942) (referring to “the most exacting fiduciary 
standards”); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1563 (10th Cir. 1984) (stating that 
where the Interior Secretary “is obligated to act as a fiduciary . . . his actions must not merely meet the minimal 
requirements of administrative law, but must also pass scrutiny under the more stringent standards demanded 
of a fiduciary”). 
 309. Cf. Weiss, supra n. 210, at 87 (arguing that intergenerational equity will not be achieved until natural 
resource trust obligations are translated into enforceable obligations). 
 310. For brief discussion of some of those oversight mechanisms, see Robert L. Glicksman et al., 
Environmental Protection: Law and Policy 208–21 (5th ed., Aspen 2007). 
 311. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704, 706(2)(A) (2006). 
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administered under the current versions of FLPMA and the NFMA. 
This Article supports the adoption of a citizen suit provision authorizing 
representatives of trust beneficiaries to sue to enjoin breaches of natural resource trust 
obligations.  One potential obstacle to the creation of a workable citizen suit provision is 
the standing doctrine derived from the “Case or Controversy” clause of Article III of the 
Constitution.312  Unless a plaintiff has standing to sue, a suit brought in federal court is 
not justiciable.  That obstacle should not prove insurmountable, however. 
Under private property and trust law, trust beneficiaries are entitled to sue trustees 
for breach of fiduciary duty.313  When trust beneficiaries are numerous, a guardian or 
representative can be appointed to protect their interests.314  The need for representation 
of the unborn is reflected in some state statutes, which provide that unborn future interest 
holders may not be bound by judicial decisions affecting use of the property by present 
possessors unless their interests are represented in the litigation by a guardian ad litem or 
similar person to protect their interests.315  The question is whether the constitutional or 
prudential constraints on standing allow individuals or groups purporting to represent 
trust beneficiaries, including both present and future generations of Americans, to bring 
suit to enforce trust duties against the Forest Service and the BLM.316 
As long as the individual (or group) acting as representative for present and future 
generations is able to show his or her own ability to meet constitutional standing 
requirements (or the ability of a member to meet those requirements if the plaintiff is a 
non-governmental organization), the answer should be yes.  Generally, the Supreme 
Court requires that a litigant assert his or her own legal rights and interests, rather than 
resting a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.  The Court, 
 
 312. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
 313. See Dukeminier et al., supra n. 220, at 239 (describing role of equity courts in enforcing trustee duties 
for the protection of trust beneficiaries). 
 314. Cf. Weiss, supra n. 210, at 96–97 “Enforcement of planetary rights is appropriately done by a guardian 
or representative of future generations as a group . . . .”); id. at 120 (recommending giving standing to a 
representative of future generations in judicial or administrative proceedings involving the management of trust 
assets); id. at 123 (encouraging states to recognize standing to guardians ad litem or other representatives of 
future generations). 
 315. See Powell, supra n. 212, at 283–84; Restatement, supra n. 214, at §§ 182–186 (specifying 
circumstances in which representation of unborn future interest holders is appropriate). 
 316. In other countries with different constitutional standing provisions, the courts have allowed such 
representational standing.  The most renowned case is Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083 (Sup. Ct. Phil. 
1993) (available at http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/jul1993/gr_101083_1993.html).  The suit was a 
class action brought on behalf of citizens of the Philippines to cancel timber licensing agreements entered into 
by the national government.  The named plaintiffs, who were minors, purported to represent not only their own 
generation, but also unborn generations.  They alleged constitutional and statutory violations.  The court found  
no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the 
succeeding generations, file a class suit.  Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding 
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right 
to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.  Such a right, as hereafter expounded, considers 
the “rhythm and harmony of nature.”  . . .  Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include . . . the 
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest . . . 
and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be 
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 
Id. (text of the posted decision at nn. 9–10).  Canada’s courts have recognized “public interest standing” in 
environmental cases.  See Friends of the Earth v. Can. (Gov. in Council), 2008 FC 1183, 2008 CarswellNat 
3763 (Fed. Ct. Vancouver, B.C. Oct. 20, 2008) (finding that environmental group satisfied pubic interest 
standing because it had a genuine interest in the subject matter raised, it presented a serious issue, and there 
was no other reasonable and effective way to bring the matter before the court). 
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however, has recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties if 
three criteria are satisfied: 
The litigant must have suffered an “injury in fact,” thus giving him or her a “sufficiently 
concrete interest” in the outcome of the issue in dispute. . . ; the litigant must have a close 
relation to the third party . . . ; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s 
ability to protect his or her own interests.317 
Although the Court enunciated this third party standing test in a case involving a 
criminal defendant’s standing to raise the equal protection rights of a juror excluded from 
service, other courts have applied the test in civil suits analogous to the trust context at 
issue here.  The Court recently recognized that “federal courts routinely entertain suits 
which will result in relief for parties that are not themselves directly bringing suit.”318  It 
cited as examples trustees bringing suits to benefit their trusts and guardians ad litem 
bringing suits to benefit their wards.319  In addition, the federal courts usually allow 
parents to sue on behalf of their minor children.320 
It does not seem to be a great leap to allow third party standing to an individual 
purporting to represent the interests of present and future generations that are the 
beneficiaries of a trust encompassing federally owned lands and resources.  Such an 
individual would have to show individual injury in fact, causation, and redressability in 
the usual manner required under the Supreme Court’s environmental standing 
precedents.321  To demonstrate a close relationship with the present and future 
generation third parties the individual is representing, the plaintiff could argue, as Mary 
Wood has, that “[b]ecause the people have a direct stake in the future through their own 
life spans and those of the children born to their generation, the citizens’ present 
beneficial interest [in the preservation of trust lands and resources] inherently 
encompasses future concerns.”322  Other scholars have made similar arguments.323  
 
 317. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410–11 (1991).  One court explained the rationale for the exception to 
the normal third party standing prohibition this way: “Where right holders are unable to raise their own rights 
and their relationship with the plaintiff suggests an identity of interests, courts can be more certain that the 
litigation is necessary and that the issues will be framed clearly and effectively.”  Amato v. Wiletz, 952 F.2d 
742, 748 (3d Cir. 1991).  Amato took the position that the three factors identified by the Supreme Court in 
Powers are not necessarily the only factors relevant to deciding whether third party standing is permissible.  
For example, “a suit between state governmental units may conflict with federal courts’ traditional federalism 
concerns about interfering with essentially state matters.”  Id. at 750.  In addition, third party standing rules 
may be relaxed in cases involving the First Amendment.  See IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 49 (1st 
Cir. 2008). 
 318. Sprint Commun.  Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 128 S Ct. 2531, 2543 (2008). 
 319. Id. 
 320. See e.g. Altman v. Bedford C. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 70 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 321. E.g. Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).  This would include the need to show an injury in fact that is 
temporally and geographically proximate to the challenged activity of the trustee.  See id.; Lujan v. Natl. 
Wildlife Fedn., 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
 322. Wood, supra n. 222, at 27. 
 323. See e.g. Burns H. Weston, Climate Change and Intergenerational Justice: Foundational Reflections, 9 
Vt. J. Envtl. L. 375, 406 (2008) (“If future interests can generate moral obligations to be fulfilled by present-
day duty-bearers, it is also true that proxy or surrogate rights-holders, lawfully appointed, can cause future 
interests to be treated as legally recognized rights.” (emphasis in original)).  Cf. id. at 384 (“In the ecological 
context (climate change of course included), there is no theoretically plausible reason why remote unborn 
persons should not be accorded deference in roughly the same manner as persons living today or soon to 
follow.”); id. at 389 (arguing that children are the representatives of future generations).  Edith Brown Weiss 
has encouraged the recognition of “planetary rights” that are generational, group rights that encompass “rights 
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Finally, the hindrance to the ability of future generations to bring suit on their own behalf 
obviously lies in the fact that, by definition, they have not yet been born.324 As Professor 
Weiss has argued, the inability of future generations to assert their interests makes it 
“necessary to have some existing body [to] represent their interests in judicial 
proceedings.”325  Indeed, at least one court in an early environmental law case granted 
standing to an environmental group to represent the interests of future generations.326 
C. Sustainability Standards for the Federal Lands 
In contexts as diverse as the multiple use, sustained yield mandates that govern the 
Forest Service and BLM and the Brundtland Commission’s 1987 report, the pursuit of 
sustainable resource use and development has involved an effort to prevent present use 
from unfairly compromising future choice.  Regardless of context, sustainability reflects 
a commitment to intergenerational equity.327  But recognition that the present generation 
is obliged to future generations to manage its natural resource use to avoid compromising 
future choice provides little guidance on the precise nature of the obligation in different 
settings.328 
The organic statutes for the multiple use, sustained yield agencies have 
traditionally afforded the Forest Service and the BLM broad discretion to balance 
competing uses.  The courts often have been loath to second-guess agency policy choices 
in light of that discretion.  As a result, the existing framework for managing the multiple 
use lands risks providing inadequate protection of the interests of future generations.  If 
Congress were to create a public lands trust under which the Forest Service and the BLM 
are obliged to protect ecological integrity, the courts would likely provide significantly 
less deference to the decisions of the trustee agencies than they do now.  Congress 
should go beyond merely creating such a trust, however.  In addition, it should redefine 
(or require the agencies to redefine) the management standards governing management 
of the trust lands and resources.  These standards should be based on scientific 
information concerning the impact of various activities on the ability of various 
ecosystems to provide valuable services.  They should require the agencies to avoid land 
and resource management that threatens the integrity of the ecological systems entrusted 
to their care by codifying the same kind of precautionary posture that characterizes the 
federal pollution control laws.  As the author lacks the scientific expertise to draft such 
 
to planetary conditions of diversity and quality comparable to those enjoyed by previous generations. . . .”  
Weiss, supra n. 210, at 96.  She adds that remedies for violations of the rights of living individuals may often 
benefit the rest of the generation, thus retaining their character as group rights.  Id. at 97. 
 324. The same argument applies to children of the present generation, who are incapable of suing to 
vindicate their own rights absent representation. 
 325. Edith Brown Weiss, Conservation and Equity Between Generations, in Contemporary Issues in 
International Law: Essays in Honor of Louis B. Sohn 245, 279 (Thomas Buergenthal ed., N.P. Engel 1984). 
 326. Cape May Co. Ch., Inc., Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504, 514 (D.N.J. 1971) 
(suit to preserve marine resources by enjoining dredge and fill operations). 
 327. See Steven Dovers & Robin Connor, Institutional and Policy Change for Sustainability, in 
Environmental Law, supra n. 1, at 32 (contending that a central element of the concept of sustainability is 
achieving “a pattern of economic and human development that does not damage the opportunities for future 
generations to use natural resources and enjoy a healthy environment, while allowing for human development 
goals, especially for the world’s poor, to be met in the near term”). 
 328. See Weiss, supra n. 210, at 47 (stating that “the core value of intergenerational equity . . . has long 
played an important role in natural-resource law and policy”); Scientists, supra n. 2, at 14 (same). 
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standards, this section simply provides examples of the kinds of management standards 
that might be consistent with such a trust-based mandate to preserve ecological integrity 
for the benefit of present and future generations. 
1. Codifying a General Sustainability Mandate 
Federal land management agencies other than the Forest Service and the BLM 
already operate under statutory or regulatory mandates that prioritize the protection of 
ecosystem integrity.  The National Park Service (NPS), for example, precludes approval 
of a plan of operations for mineral resource assessment activities in units of the National 
Park System in Alaska at which the federal government owns the surface estate but not 
the mineral rights if mineral extractions operations “would substantially interfere with 
management of the unit to ensure the preservation of its natural and ecological integrity 
in perpetuity, or would significantly injure the federally-owned or controlled lands or 
waters.”329 
Similarly, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) prepares conservation plans for 
national wildlife refuges that describe “the desired future conditions of a refuge . . .” and 
that seek to “restore[ ] the ecological integrity of each refuge and the Refuge System.”330  
The FWS’s management regulations for the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Marine 
National Monument allow issuance of permits to conduct activities in the Monument 
only if the agency finds, among other things, that an activity “can be conducted with 
adequate safeguards for the resources and ecological integrity of the Monument.”331  
Agency regulations define “ecological integrity” as “a condition determined to be 
characteristic of an ecosystem that has the ability to maintain the function, structure, and 
abundance of natural biological communities, including rates of change in response to 
natural environmental variation.”332 
A trust-based set of sustainability standards for the multiple use lands should not 
provide that environmental concerns trump economic and social factors in every case.  
Instead, they should preclude projects or activities that pose a significant threat333 to the 
ecological integrity (using a definition such as the NPS definition quoted above) of the 
lands or resources encompassed by the trust.  Activities that pose such threats are likely 
to adversely affect economic and social sustainability in the long run, even if they appear 
 
 329. 36 C.F.R. § 9.37(a)(3) (2008).  See also id. at § 9.86(c)(1) (requiring that mineral operations “be 
designed to be carried out in an environmentally sound manner, as determined in appropriate environmental 
documentation, that: (1) Does not result in lasting environmental impacts that appreciably alter the natural 
character of the units or the integrity of the biological or ecological systems in the units”). 
 330. 50 C.F.R. § 25.12 (2008) (emphasis omitted). 
 331. Id. at § 404.11(d).  In addition, activities must be conducted in a manner compatible with the purposes 
of the proclamation that created the Monument, considering the extent to which the activity may diminish the 
Monument’s ecological integrity, any indirect, secondary or cumulative effects of the activity, and the duration 
of such effects; “[t]he end value of the activity outweighs its adverse impacts on Monument resources, 
qualities, and ecological integrity”; and “[t]he methods and procedures proposed by the applicant are 
appropriate to achieve the proposed activity’s goals in relation to their impacts to Monument resources, 
qualities, and ecological integrity.”  Id. 
 332. Id. at § 404.3 (emphasis omitted).  Cf. 43 C.F.R. § 10005.19(a) (2008) (specifying “decision factors” 
that require projects under the Central Utah Project Completion Act, Pub. Law. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600, 
4625 (1992), to satisfy a “Biological Integrity” standard by, among other things, protecting, restoring, or 
enhancing “the ecological functions, values, and integrity of natural ecosystems supporting fish and wildlife 
resources”). 
 333. A standard that omitted the adjective “significant” would be more protective than the one in the text. 
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to promote economic productivity in the short run.334 
2. Specific Sustainability Standards 
More specific statutory standards or agency regulations should supplement the 
general obligation of the multiple use agencies to manage trust resources in a way that 
preserves ecological integrity335  But the standards should not be so detailed and 
prescriptive that they divest the agencies of the flexibility they need to respond to 
changing conditions, unanticipated developments, and new knowledge.336  The aim 
should be to achieve the proper balance between the flexibility afforded by broad, 
discretionary mandates and the accountability provided by more specific, judicially 
enforceable standards. 
One way to infuse specific content into a general mandate to protect ecological 
integrity is to identify a resource or set of resources that can serve as a surrogate for the 
condition of the ecosystem of which it is a part.  The use of surrogates or proxies is 
commonplace in environmental and natural resource management laws.337  The Forest 
Service is experienced in the use of surrogates.  The NFMA requires that land and 
resource management plans for units of the National Forest System provide for the 
protection of biological diversity.338  The Forest Service has used both management 
indicator species and the habitat of those species, with varying degrees of success, as 
surrogates for the diversity of the unit concerned.339  Similar surrogates may be available 
for the protection of ecological integrity in other contexts.  Once the agency chooses 
surrogates, it should have to track their fate to adapt management techniques to ensure 
the continued vitality of those surrogates and the ecosystems they represent. 
a. Certification Standards 
Standards to protect ecological integrity need not necessarily be uniform; instead, 
they should vary with the context.  The sustainability standards developed by two 
international certification bodies − one for forest protection and one for marine resource 
protection—illustrate the context-specific nature of sustainability standards.340  They 
also reflect several general principles that merit inclusion in any sustainability standards 
administered by the Forest Service and the BLM. 
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is a non-profit international organization 
 
 334. See supra nn. 161–162, 169 and accompanying text. 
 335. Dan Tarlock has identified two conditions that are necessary to the success of environmentally 
sustainable development: first, the embodiment of sustainability in a set of legal principles that constrain 
behavior, and, second, the creation of an institutional infrastructure to implement those principles.  
“Otherwise,” Tarlock notes, sustainability “will remain an unrealized aspiration.”  Tarlock, supra n. 49, at 40. 
 336. Cf. Sen. Rpt. 93-686 (Feb. 18, 1974) (reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4060, 4075) (“Wise management is 
based upon facts and takes into account emerging, tested knowledge.  Since we are constantly learning it would 
hardly be productive to try to cast into legislative fiat prescriptions for management.”); see also Glicksman, 
supra n. 124, at 469–71 (explaining the role of “bounded rationality” in natural resource management); Sidney 
A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Risk Regulation at Risk: Restoring a Pragmatic Approach 22–24 (Stan. U. 
Press 2003). 
 337. See generally Glicksman, supra n. 124, passim. 
 338. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B). 
 339. See Glicksman, supra n. 124, at 493. 
 340. Many thanks to Professor Andrew Torrance for introducing me to the role of international certification 
organizations in natural resource protection. 
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established in 1994 after the Rio Conference by a coalition of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) led by the World Wild Fund for Nature.341  The FSC includes 
representatives of industry, environmental NGOs, and social justice NGOs.342  The 
Council accredits organizations to certify private entities whose activities are found to be 
in compliance with the standards and criteria that describe sustainable forest 
management practices.343  Certification may allow businesses to charge a premium for 
timber managed in accordance with FSC standards and provide them with improved 
access to environmentally sensitive markets.344  The Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC), an international non-profit organization whose goal is the achievement of well 
managed fisheries, operates on the same model.  It creates environmental standards for a 
well-managed fishery.  A certification that fish have been caught in a manner consistent 
with environmentally sustainable principles is designed to attract environmentally 
concerned consumers.345 
 
 341. Andrew Long, Auditing for Sustainable Forest Management, 31 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 6–7 (2006). 
 342. Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The New Role for Assurance Services in Global 
Commerce, 33 J. Corp. L. 325, 343 n.71 (2008) (citing Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global 
Private-Public Regulation: The Case of Forestry, 17 European J. Intl. L. 47, 51 (2006)).  Its members elect 
representatives to sit on a three-chambered board (environmental, social, and economic), one of whose 
functions is to establish regional standards and criteria for sustainable forest management.  Melissa Dorn, 
Summary of the Conference on Global Environmental Governance, 19 Geo. Intl. Envtl. L. Rev. 303, 311 
(2007) (“The FSC, a nonprofit international organization, attempts to find solutions to problems created by bad 
forestry practices and to reward good forest management.”); Long, supra n. 341, at 7–8. 
 343. Forest Stewardship Council (“FSC”), How FSC Policies and Standards Are Developed, 
http://www.fsc.org/fsc-rules.html?&L=0 (accessed Apr. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Policies] (“To earn FSC 
certification and the right to use the FSC label, an organization must first adapt its management and operations 
to conform to all applicable FSC requirements.  What the FSC rules prescribe is implemented in forests around 
the world.”).  See also FSC Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship 2 (1996) available at 
http://www.fscus.org/images/ documents/FSC_Principles_Criteria.pdf) [hereinafter Principles]. 
 344. Policies, supra n. 343.  According to the FSC, the organization 
uses certification to engage market dynamics in driving recognition for forests at large and in 
improving social and environmental standards in forest management practices worldwide.  FSC 
standards ensure that these forests maintain the values and benefits they provide to society.  By 
providing a market differentiation mechanism, FSC enables responsible forest managers to capture 
more value from their forests. 
Id.  The FSC has certified more than 175 million acres of forest worldwide.  Dorn, supra n. 342, at 311. 
 345. Blair, Williams & Lin, supra n. 342, at 343 n.71.  See also Principles, supra n. 343, at 2 (stating that 
“growing public awareness of forest destruction and degradation has led consumers to demand that their 
purchases of wood and other forest products will not contribute to this destruction but rather help to secure 
forest resources for the future,” and that, “[in] response to these demands, certification and self-certification 
programs of wood products have proliferated in the marketplace”).  The Council describes the function of 
certification as follows: 
On a voluntary basis, fisheries which conform to these Principles and Criteria will be eligible for 
certification by independent MSC-accredited certifiers.  Fish processors, traders and retailers will be 
encouraged to make public commitments to purchase fish products only from certified sources.  
This will allow consumers to select fish products with the confidence that they come from 
sustainable, well managed sources.  It will also benefit the fishers and the fishing industry who 
depend on the abundance of fish stocks, by providing market incentives to work towards sustainable 
practices.  Fish processors, traders and retailers who buy from certified sustainable sources will in 
turn benefit from the assurance of continuity of future supply and hence sustainability of their own 
businesses. 
Marine Stewardship Council (“MSC”), MSC Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Fishing 1 
(Nov. 2002) (available at http://www.msc.org/documents/msc-standards/MSC_environmental_standard_ 
for_sustainable_fishing.pdf).   “As of mid-2006, nineteen fisheries for Alaskan salmon, South African hake, 
and other fish had been certified, and seventeen more were undergoing full assessment.”  Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. 
Rev. 913, 923 (2007). 
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The FSC describes its sustainability principles and criteria (P & C) as “the highest 
social and environmental requirements in the forestry sector.”346  The ten principles and 
the fifty-six criteria that further define and explain them are explicitly designed to reflect 
intergenerational equity; they “describe how the forests have to be managed to meet the 
social, economic, ecological, cultural and spiritual needs of present and future 
generations.”347  Similarly, the MSC’s P & C seek to achieve sustainable fisheries 
worldwide.  The MSC defines a sustainable fishery, in part, as one that “maintains 
present and future economic and social options and benefits.”348  Principle 1 provides 
that “[a] fishery must be conducted in a manner that does not lead to over-fishing or 
depletion of the exploited populations.”349  According to the MSC, “[t]he intent of this 
principle is to ensure that the productive capacities of resources are maintained at high 
levels and are not sacrificed in favour of short term interests.”350 
Both institutions define sustainable resource management in terms of the 
protection of ecological integrity rather than solely by reference to the volume of 
commodities (harvested timber or fish caught).  One FSC principles states that “[f]orest 
management shall conserve biological diversity and its associated values, water 
resources, soils, and unique and fragile ecosystems and landscapes, and, by so doing, 
maintain the ecological functions and the integrity of the forest.”351  The accompanying 
criteria state that “[e]cological functions and values shall be maintained intact, enhanced, 
or restored, including: a) [f]orest regeneration and succession[;]  b) [g]enetic, species, 
and ecosystem diversity[;]  c) [n]atural cycles that affect the productivity of the forest 
ecosystem.”352  Those functions and values can serve as surrogates for the protection of 
ecological integrity.  The FSC’s P & C dictate that forest managers “where appropriate, 
enhance the value of forest services and resources such as watersheds and fisheries.”353 
The MSC’s P & C also rely on the preservation of ecosystem integrity as a 
fundamental measure of sustainable fisheries.  According to the MSC, “a sustainable 
fishery should be based upon . . . [t]he maintenance of the integrity of ecosystems.”354  
 
 346. Policies, supra n. 343.  The P & C apply to all tropical, temperate, and boreal forests.  Principles, supra 
n. 343, at 2.   
 347. FSC, The FSC Principles and Criteria for Responsible Forest Management, http://www.fsc. 
org/pc.html (accessed Apr. 29, 2009).  See also Principles, supra n. 343, at 2.  (“It is widely accepted that 
forest resources and associated lands should be managed to meet the social, economic, ecological, cultural and 
spiritual needs of present and future generations.”). 
 348. MSC, supra n. 345, at 2. 
 349. Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted). 
 350. Id. 
 351. Principles, supra n. 343. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id.  The FSC also recognizes the interdependencies of environmental, social, and economic 
sustainability.  One of its principles states that “[f]orest management should strive toward economic viability, 
while taking into account the full environmental, social, and operational costs of production, and ensuring the 
investments necessary to maintain the ecological productivity of the forest.”  Id. 
 354. MSC, supra n. 345, at 1.  In addition, a sustainable fishery should be based on “[t]he maintenance and 
re-establishment of healthy populations of targeted species” and “[t]he development and maintenance of 
effective fisheries management systems, taking into account all relevant biological, technological, economic, 
social, environmental and commercial aspects.”  Id. 
  The regulations of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Fisheries 
promulgated under the Magnuson-Stevens Act are already geared toward the protection of ecological integrity 
to some degree.  The Act is designed to prevent overfishing by achieving “optimum yield.”  The latter is 
defined as the amount of fish that “[w]ill provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, particularly with 
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The MSC further defines a sustainable fishery as one that is conducted in such a way that 
“it maintains and seeks to maximise, ecological health and abundance” and “maintains 
the diversity, structure and function of the ecosystem on which it depends as well as the 
quality of its habitat, minimising the adverse effects that it causes.”355  Another principle 
provides that “[f]ishing operations should allow for the maintenance of the structure, 
productivity, function and diversity of the ecosystem (including habitat and associated 
dependent and ecologically related species) on which the fishery depends.”356  To 
comply with the P & C, fishery management must maintain “natural functional 
relationships among species[, may] not lead to trophic cascades or ecosystem state 
changes,” “may not threaten biological diversity at the genetic, species or population 
levels,” and must “minimize mortality of, or injuries to endangered or protected 
species.”357 
Finally, both the FSC and MSC P & C take the position that forest and fisheries 
management decisions should reflect a precautionary approach that is designed to err on 
the side of protecting the ecological integrity of the resources involved.  The FSC P & C 
with SmartWood Indicators dictate that allowable harvests “be based on conservative, 
well-documented, and most current estimates of growth and yield.”358  The MSC places 
greater emphasis on precautionary management.  It explains that its first principle, which 
prohibits overfishing, requires fishery managers to “provide margins of safety for error 
and uncertainty.”359  The P & C also provide that depleted fisheries be managed 
“consistent with the precautionary approach and the ability of the populations to produce 
long-term potential yields.”360  Depleted fisheries also must be rebuilt “to a specified 
level consistent with the precautionary approach and the ability of the populations to 
produce long-term potential yields within a specified time frame.”361  Finally, Principle 
3 requires effective management of fisheries, which includes decisions that are made “in 
 
respect to food production and recreational opportunities, and taking into account the protection of marine 
ecosystems.”  50 C.F.R. § 600.10(1) (2008). 
 355. MSC, supra n. 345, at 2.  Alternative definitions of ecological integrity are available.  The Committee 
of Scientists, for example, has proposed that: 
[A]n ecosystem has ecological integrity when it can maintain characteristic compositions, 
structures, and processes against a background of anthropogenic changes in environmental 
conditions.  Ecosystems with high ecological integrity continue to express the evolutionary and 
biogeographic processes that gave rise to the current biota; they have a species composition, 
diversity, and functional organization expected from natural habitats of the region; and they are 
resilient to environmental change and disturbance occurring within their natural range of variability. 
Scientists, supra n. 2, at 34–35.  The Committee also opined that “perhaps the single best metric of sustainable 
use of land is the persistence of species over time.  The public needs to understand that the productivity of an 
ecosystem can be sustained over the long term only if species persist.”  Id. at 40.  It also stated its belief “that 
conserving habitat for native species and the processes of ecological systems remains the surest path to 
maintaining ecological sustainability.”  Id. at 146. 
 356. MSC, supra n. 345, at 3.  According to the FSC, the principle is meant “to encourage the management 
of fisheries from an ecosystem perspective under a system designed to assess and restrain the impacts of the 
fishery on the ecosystem.”  Id. 
 357. Id. at 3–4. 
 358. Rainforest Alliance, Rainforest Alliance/SmartWood Generic Standards for Assessing Forest 
Management 5.6.2 (Jan. 16, 2008) (available at http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/forestry/documents/ 
smartwoodchinainterimstandardsjan08.pdf). 
 359. MSC, supra n. 345, at 3. 
 360. Id. at 3. 
 361. Id. 
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a timely and adaptive fashion on the basis of the best available information using a 
precautionary approach particularly when dealing with scientific uncertainty.”362 
The mandate that forest and fishery management be conducted in a precautionary 
manner is a long overdue recognition that natural resource management almost always 
takes place in an atmosphere of scientific uncertainty.  The federal pollution control 
statutes adopted in the 1970s are precautionary in nature, seeking to prevent 
environmental harm before it occurs, if possible, rather than responding to environmental 
damage after the fact.363  The courts have consistently recognized the congressional 
mandate that EPA and other agencies charged with protecting the public health and 
safety err on the side of overprotection.364  The justifications for precautionary 
regulation in the pollution control context—including the existence of scientific 
uncertainty; the impossibility or difficulty of restoring environmental damage after it 
occurs; and a recognition that the harm resulting from an erroneous decision that 
regulation is not necessary to protect health, safety, or the environment will often be 
greater than the economic and social harm resulting from an erroneous decision that 
regulation is necessary—apply just as forcefully in the natural resource management 
context. 
To some extent, the natural resource management agencies already recognize their 
duty to take a precautionary approach.  Regulations governing management of the 
nation’s fisheries, for example, dictate that fisheries councils generally “should adopt a 
precautionary approach to specification of [optimum yield].”365  A precautionary 
approach would presumably manifest itself in somewhat different forms in the context of 
federal land management, but the fisheries regulations demonstrate that the duty to act in 
a precautionary manner have been and can be applied in the natural resource 
management context.  Any statutory or regulatory overhaul of the legal framework for 
natural resource management by the Forest Service and the BLM therefore should 
mandate that the two agencies operate in a precautionary manner, pursuant to 
management constraints similar to those found in the FSC and MSC P & C. 
In sum, the FSC and MSC efforts to achieve sustainable forest and fisheries 
management provide a model that should be applied to management of federal lands and 
 
 362. Id. at 5. 
 363. See e.g. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (interpreting § 211(c)(1)(A) of the Clean 
Air Act as a precautionary statute, and stating that “[a] statute allowing for regulation in the face of danger is, 
necessarily, a precautionary statute.  Regulatory action may be taken before the threatened harm occurs; 
indeed, the very existence of such precautionary legislation would seem to demand that regulatory action 
precede, and, optimally, prevent, the perceived threat.”). 
 364. See e.g. Interfaith Community Org. v. Honeywell Intl., Inc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005) (interpreting 
the citizen suit provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); Am. Chemistry Council v. EPA, 
337 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding regulations issued under the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act); Lead Indus. Assn, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that the Clean Air Act 
precludes EPA from considering cost in developing national ambient air quality standards and interpreting the 
legislative history to direct EPA “to err on the side of caution in making the necessary decisions”). 
 365. 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(5) (2008).  The regulations identify three features of a precautionary approach in 
this context: (1) Target reference points, such as [optimum yield], should be set safely below limit reference 
points, such as the catch level associated with the fishing mortality rate; (2) A fish stock that is below the size 
that would produce maximum sustained yield should be harvested at a lower rate or level of fishing mortality 
than if the stock were above that size; and (3) “Criteria used to set target catch levels should be explicitly risk 
averse, so that greater uncertainty regarding the status or productive capacity of a stock or stock complex 
corresponds to greater caution in setting target catch levels.”  Id. 
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resources by the Forest Service and the BLM.  Several common components in particular 
can provide the foundation for sustainability of federal land and resource use.  First, the 
multiple use agencies should be required to consider the long term as well as the short 
term; they should be obliged to protect the interests of future generations and ensure that 
their decisions do not preclude resource use choices that are available at present.  
Second, the preservation of intergenerational equity depends on the protection of 
ecological integrity.  Thus, the agencies should have to justify resource management 
decisions as being consistent with the protection of ecological integrity, and they should 
be required to justify any surrogates they identify for that integrity.  Third, the Forest 
Service and the BLM should be required to operate in a precautionary manner, taking a 
conservative approach to resource management when scientific uncertainty makes 
predictions of the impact of agency actions on ecological integrity difficult.366 
V. CONCLUSION 
Sustainable resource use has been enshrined as an important goal of domestic and 
international environmental and natural resource management laws for decades.  Yet, as 
Dan Tarlock has pointed out, “the core principle that we must restrain present 
consumption for the benefit of future generations is a powerful idea that runs counter to 
the longstanding Western belief in progress.”367  The Forest Service and the BLM have 
long operated under sustained yield mandates.  Those laws are susceptible to 
interpretations that prioritize commodity production that is easily expressed in 
quantitative terms.  Perhaps more importantly, the sustained yield component of the 
multiple use, sustained yield statutes has done little to require the Forest Service or the 
BLM to adjust management priorities or methodologies in an effort to assure the 
availability to future generations of the full array of resource use options currently 
offered by the federal lands. 
If the nation is committed to achieving sustainability on the federal lands, 
Congress should amend the NFMA and FLPMA.  It should require the Forest Service 
and the BLM to factor sustainability into its decision making processes at every level, 
from plan formulation to site-specific implementation.  It should define sustainability in 
terms of the preservation of ecological integrity. 368  It should create a trust comprised of 
the lands and resources managed by the Forest Service and the BLM and authorize 
citizen suits to protect the interest of trust beneficiaries, including future generations of 
 
 366. The MSC P & C suggest a fourth building block for sustainable federal land use.  The MSC requires 
that fishery management “provide economic and social incentives that contribute to sustainable fishing and . . . 
not operate with subsidies that contribute to unsustainable fishing.”  MSC, supra n. 345, at 5.  Both Congress 
and the agencies should cease providing incentives for actions that threaten ecological integrity and instead 
should structure their decisions so as to reward those whose actions contribute to the protection of ecological 
integrity. 
 367. Tarlock, supra note 49, at 48. 
 368. See e.g. Gillroy, Holland & Campbell-Mohn, supra n. 87, at 202–03 (“As long as ecosystem 
management requires more than concern for economic wealth generation, the distinct demands of multiple-use 
management and ecosystem management in the law can be resolved only through the creation of a distinct 
paradigm that places ecosystem integrity, or the non-use value of nature, as a core component of resource 
law.”).  The authors support “a new emphasis on the ecological health and integrity of ecosystems, that is, on 
their resiliency, resistance, stability, elasticity, constancy, and persistence.  These conditions of integrity are 
intrinsic functional concerns and are not part of the market-resource approach to environmental policy, which 
can only fully evaluate the use value of nature’s resources.”  Id. at 208. 
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Americans.  Finally, the statutes governing the two agencies should include (or require 
the Forest Service and the BLM to adopt) science-based management standards that are 
sufficiently concrete to be judicially enforceable and that require the agencies to take 
steps to protect the ecological integrity of the affected federal lands so that current use 
does not prevent present and future generations of Americans from enjoying the benefits 
of the ecosystem services now supplied by those lands. 
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